Go to any playground, classroom or backyard where young children gather and you can locate a teacher or a parent trying to instill the importance of sharing. From toys to snacks, to our time and resources, we learn from a very early age that sharing is a virtue. It's a fundamental childhood lesson drafted to make us better people and better members of society. Leave to many boardrooms, office buildings and cubicles within the corporate world and, for the highest many part, you can locate sharing is a lost art. People aren't bad, but general corporate race and processes fail to encourage real teamwork. Most people are out for themselves, trying to outshine and outdo one another for promotions and recognition in cutthroat competition that encourages confrontation rather than collaboration. The good regarding the business is a byproduct of this behavior, not the goal. There exists teams within the corporate world; many of them are successful. But too many managers and team leaders take the credit for their team's hard work – creating use of "I" more often than "we" when describing success. And as the old saying goes, "There is no ‘I' in teamwork." I located this to be true in my own career. I first joined the working world within the real estate sector when I joined my father's company. I was excited to work in a team environment and develop an exciting business in what I thought was a collaborative profession. Was I ever wrong. Each real estate broker was interested only in his or her own accomplishments; the success regarding the team wasn't even a consideration. I grew the family business and soon located myself in a leadership position within the company. I thought if I were in charge, things should be different. I dedicated myself to fostering a team environment, receiving the time and life to invest within the people I brought on board to help them and our business grow. I believed that if I developed a supportive, collaborative workplace, no one should ever should leave. I worked on being what I regarded a servant leader – giving completely of my time and my knowledge to my colleagues and the business, believing we all should benefit from this practice. Wrong again. Some regarding the top people I trained and brought along left the brokerage and became my direct competition. At one point, I realized I was responsible for helping build many brokerages within the Los Angeles area, all started by my former colleagues. I could not trust what was happening at the time. I thought I had done everything right. Upon thinking about it, I realized my strategy had a fatal flaw: While the environment I created encouraged teamwork with me, it did not encourage teamwork between everyone on the team. I took the time to coach and help people like a servant leader, but the processes we had in location did not reward others for working with one another while recognizing lone achievement. Teamwork is higher than basically assembling a team of people together with a goal; true teamwork requires tough leadership, an usual vision and a race that reinforces and rewards collaboration. In my years in business, I've identified "Nine Cs" that every good servant leader should master to build a successful team:
Culture. Teamwork does not just naturally happen. You should make a business race that encourages and rewards it at every level. You should systematize teamwork — engrain it in every facet of your business. Recognize not only the top lone but also the top team in your office. Tie teamwork to bonuses and promotions, not just the bottom line. Without a supportive race in place, teamwork should be a phrase rather than an action.
True teamwork
requires strong
leadership, vision
and a culture
that reinforces
and rewards
collaboration. Cause. Successful teams are inspired teams. You do not inspire teams with tasks; you inspire teams with dreams. Release them a reason bigger than themselves to leave out there and release 110 percent. At World Financial Team Inc., our cause — our crusade — is to help middle-income families who have traditionally been underserved by the e&l insurance services sector to obtain on track to their futures by educating them about money. That is a dream people can get behind. When my teammates leave out and help a family, it's not just business to them. Their actions have meaning and purpose, and they get a sense of satisfaction that they have helped make a difference in someone's life. I take this so seriously that I play on my final name and tell everyone I am a "cruzader" for our mission. Servant leaders should convey the "why" to their teams. And that leads me to my next point. Communication. A servant leader keeps in constant communication with his/her team. Share successes. Make them component regarding the business by being transparent, reveal and honest. Good and constant communication builds a foundation of trust. Trust fortifies the bonds compulsory for teams to flourish and businesses to grow. Collaboration. Locate opportunities for people to work together and play to their strengths. Combine up the players on your team so people hold a chance to work with everyone. Changing things around breeds new perspectives and new ideas. Coach. Make an environment that encourages and rewards people for sharing and teaching others what they know. The general corporate world seems to discourage this. By tying promotions, recognition and rewards to lone accomplishments, employees tend to hold their skills and abilities to themselves rather than teaching others for the common good. When you build a business that rewards mentoring, experienced professionals shall share their skills. We do this at World Financial Team Inc. As an associate with our company, you have knowledge of access to multiple experienced professionals/coaches. No reason where you can be in business, you have knowledge of someone to mentor you. This practice builds a successful business and a strong, confident, growing team driven by a nurturing business environment. Commitment. Servant leaders should lead by example and display other teammates at every turn they can be committed to their lone success and the success regarding the business. They should release their time and talents to helping others, and in turn, this shall help the business to grow. The commitment position you give, is the commitment position you get return from your team. Compassion. Good servant leaders do not just speak they like about their teammates; they display it. Take the time to obtain to have knowledge of each and every team member, their families, their goals and dreams. Understanding your teammates and getting to have knowledge of who they truly are shall help you be an improved leader.
Create an
environment of
giving and everything
comes return to you
tenfold. Challenge. Evaluate the company's business goals regularly and work with team members to develop lone and collective milestones to obtain there. Good servant leaders hold the team members in tune with business goals and stretch the team's vision so they can achieve what they not ever thought they could. Your ultimate goal is to challenge your team members and build other servant leaders. Cheerleader. A servant leader shall also be the cheerleader, giving the team the dose of motivation they should leave out and do their jobs to the greatest of their abilities. Encourage your teammates with frequent calls. Reward their initiative and accomplishments in front regarding the entire team. As team leader, you can be the director of motivation, a job you should take seriously. By affiliating myself with a business that understands and values teamwork, my team members and I have built a tough financial services and insurance business that has helped so many people. We eagerly share our knowledge with each other and focus on helping families in a collaborative, inviting environment that people locate enjoyable and rewarding. People speak walking into our World Financial Team Inc. office is like walking into a building where people really like about one another. That is the professional race I always wanted to be a component of and howcome I like going to work every day. I truly trust that life is regarding the give, not the get. Whether you make an environment of giving, everything returns return to you tenfold.
©World Financial Group, Inc. Reprinted with permission. This post was edited for electronic use.
Saturday, 31 March 2012
Friday, 30 March 2012
Top seven Myths About Financial Planning
There's very many of misconception about financial planning and how it can help you. Here is a list regarding the top seven myths surrounding financial planning. We hope that by dispelling little of these common myths you can get an improved understanding of financial advisers and how they can assist you to achieving financial prosperity and security.
Myth #1: Only people who have already accumulated wealth and/or assets can look a financial adviser
This is one regarding the biggest myths surrounding seeking professional financial advice. Most people trust that you have knowledge of to have already established you financially prior to a financial planner can help you. Some financial advisers shall only need to work with you whether you have knowledge of some established assets as by advising you on how to allocate this wealth this allows them to be paid. At Financial Spectrum, our financial advisers are fee-for-service, or charge a flat fee instead of earning a commission. This means that they can be can assist you in accumulating wealth through things for example setting up savings plans and budgeting, whereas other advisers will not as they would not earn a commission for this advice. The price of advice at the early stages of your life should be just as great, if not greater than when you have knowledge of already built up your wealth.
Myth #2: Financial Planners just sell their clients managed funds
Many people trust that financial planners just sell managed funds to their clients. This isn't true. Whilst a financial adviser can recommend their clients invest in critical investments as one tool to help grow their wealth, a holistic financial planner shall look at parts for example debt reduction, tax minimisation, property, shares, superannuation, insurance, and cash flow just to name a few. All of these parts are important when seeing to grow and secure wealth – not just investing into products. Some financial advisers hold a greater emphasis on placing their clients compare holiday insurance as this gives them with payment via a commission. This perhaps shall explain howcome this myth is an usual one. Not all financial advisers are equal however. Financial Spectrum is within the minority when it returns to offering clients truly holistic advice. Due to the fact that Financial Spectrum does not earn commissions, its' financial advisers location just as many emphasis on parts for example paying fewer tax and budgeting, as placing clients in managed fund investments.
Myth #3: I've already got an accountant, so I do not need a financial planner.
Many people already have an accountant that they have knowledge of and trust for their financial wants so they do not ponder that they should benefit from seeking the services of a financial planner. What most people do not understand however, is that consequently it is very important that accountants and financial planners work together in partnership, most fulfil very different needs. Financial advisers are trained to take a more holistic approach to your finances than accountants are. Whereas an accountant shall done your tax return or release advice for tiny business, a financial planner shall work with you on understanding your life goals and help to implement a financial procedure to help you achieve them.
At Financial Spectrum, we work closely in partnership with accountants to make sure that that our clients receive the benefit of a team approach.
Myth #4: I do not need a financial planner – I'm nowhere near close to retirement
A common misconception is that financial planners are only to help retirees or people starting to ponder about retiring. This is very distant from the truth! Whilst it is true that there exists many financial advisory firms whose target market are retirees, at Financial Spectrum we trust the true price of financial advice should be gained by starting early. Most of our clients are younger professionals in their 20s, 30s and 40s who are at the accumulation stage of their lives. We have knowledge of that we are within the minority when it returns to our competitors but we are passionate about helping young Australians get ahead financially. We help our clients to map out the goals they need to achieve within the short, moderate and long term, and work with them to implement a financial procedure to help achieve these goals. Time is your biggest ally when it returns to setting you up financially – so do not wait until you can be in your 50s and 60s to beginning planning for the future! Myth #5: Financial planners charge too many and get hefty kickbacks from businesses they recommend their clients invest in
Financial planners have received very many of bad press over the years and the result is that many Australians hold a very negative view regarding the trustworthiness regarding the financial planning industry. In truth, individuals authorised to give financial advice to people in Australia are bound by strict regulations from the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC). All remuneration received by implementing a proposed financial procedure should be clearly outlined in a Statement of Advice (SoA) which should be provided to client. This enables transparency within the financial planning process such that you have knowledge of exactly how many your financial adviser should be paid in relation to your financial plan.
At Financial Spectrum, we have gone one step distant and developed a fee-for-service or a fixed fee payment structure such that we do not receive any commissions from any investment product that we recommend to our clients. This means that our clients pay for our advice. We trust that this fee structure helps to protect our clients from potential conflicts of interest. In addition we release a section of packages for our clients to select from such that they can look comfortable that they are getting price for money. Myth #6: All financial advisers are the same. Should not I just look the adviser at my bank branch?
There are financial advisers, and then there exists financial advisers. Whilst it's true that all financial planners in Australia should be authorised below a financial planning licence from ASIC, it is important to have knowledge of that there exists potential conflicts of interest that shall arise by seeking the services of a financial adviser who is connected to a large institution – be that a bank or other financial institution. Why? Financial advisers who are component of financial institutions who release their own financial products (eg. life insurance and investments) shall likely be restricted to a tiny selection of products that they can release their clients. This means that whether you went to Bank XYZ seeking advice and the financial planner at Bank XYZ identified that you need income protection – it is likely that they will be restricted by the XYZ Bank to only give you with advice to obtain an XYZ Income Protection policy. The difficulty is that your XYZ financial adviser may have knowledge of that an improved policy for your situation should be provided to you by ABC Life Insurance, but due to the fact that they can be component regarding the XYZ institution, they can not release this policy to you.
The good news is that not all financial advisers in Australia are component of large corporations and that is why are better can give you with a wider selection of investment and insurance products from a section of providers in Australia. These financial advisers tend to be known as "boutique" or "privately-owned" financial planning firms as ASIC restricts the use regarding the phrase "independent". These tiny boutique financial advisory firms are within the minority as many have been bought out by the larger institutions and not ever have the massive monetary resources of their competitors, but they can be out there and can release you good financial advice. Financial Spectrum is one such privately-owned financial planning firm based within the Sydney CBD.
Myth #1: Only people who have already accumulated wealth and/or assets can look a financial adviser
This is one regarding the biggest myths surrounding seeking professional financial advice. Most people trust that you have knowledge of to have already established you financially prior to a financial planner can help you. Some financial advisers shall only need to work with you whether you have knowledge of some established assets as by advising you on how to allocate this wealth this allows them to be paid. At Financial Spectrum, our financial advisers are fee-for-service, or charge a flat fee instead of earning a commission. This means that they can be can assist you in accumulating wealth through things for example setting up savings plans and budgeting, whereas other advisers will not as they would not earn a commission for this advice. The price of advice at the early stages of your life should be just as great, if not greater than when you have knowledge of already built up your wealth.
Myth #2: Financial Planners just sell their clients managed funds
Many people trust that financial planners just sell managed funds to their clients. This isn't true. Whilst a financial adviser can recommend their clients invest in critical investments as one tool to help grow their wealth, a holistic financial planner shall look at parts for example debt reduction, tax minimisation, property, shares, superannuation, insurance, and cash flow just to name a few. All of these parts are important when seeing to grow and secure wealth – not just investing into products. Some financial advisers hold a greater emphasis on placing their clients compare holiday insurance as this gives them with payment via a commission. This perhaps shall explain howcome this myth is an usual one. Not all financial advisers are equal however. Financial Spectrum is within the minority when it returns to offering clients truly holistic advice. Due to the fact that Financial Spectrum does not earn commissions, its' financial advisers location just as many emphasis on parts for example paying fewer tax and budgeting, as placing clients in managed fund investments.
Myth #3: I've already got an accountant, so I do not need a financial planner.
Many people already have an accountant that they have knowledge of and trust for their financial wants so they do not ponder that they should benefit from seeking the services of a financial planner. What most people do not understand however, is that consequently it is very important that accountants and financial planners work together in partnership, most fulfil very different needs. Financial advisers are trained to take a more holistic approach to your finances than accountants are. Whereas an accountant shall done your tax return or release advice for tiny business, a financial planner shall work with you on understanding your life goals and help to implement a financial procedure to help you achieve them.
At Financial Spectrum, we work closely in partnership with accountants to make sure that that our clients receive the benefit of a team approach.
Myth #4: I do not need a financial planner – I'm nowhere near close to retirement
A common misconception is that financial planners are only to help retirees or people starting to ponder about retiring. This is very distant from the truth! Whilst it is true that there exists many financial advisory firms whose target market are retirees, at Financial Spectrum we trust the true price of financial advice should be gained by starting early. Most of our clients are younger professionals in their 20s, 30s and 40s who are at the accumulation stage of their lives. We have knowledge of that we are within the minority when it returns to our competitors but we are passionate about helping young Australians get ahead financially. We help our clients to map out the goals they need to achieve within the short, moderate and long term, and work with them to implement a financial procedure to help achieve these goals. Time is your biggest ally when it returns to setting you up financially – so do not wait until you can be in your 50s and 60s to beginning planning for the future! Myth #5: Financial planners charge too many and get hefty kickbacks from businesses they recommend their clients invest in
Financial planners have received very many of bad press over the years and the result is that many Australians hold a very negative view regarding the trustworthiness regarding the financial planning industry. In truth, individuals authorised to give financial advice to people in Australia are bound by strict regulations from the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC). All remuneration received by implementing a proposed financial procedure should be clearly outlined in a Statement of Advice (SoA) which should be provided to client. This enables transparency within the financial planning process such that you have knowledge of exactly how many your financial adviser should be paid in relation to your financial plan.
At Financial Spectrum, we have gone one step distant and developed a fee-for-service or a fixed fee payment structure such that we do not receive any commissions from any investment product that we recommend to our clients. This means that our clients pay for our advice. We trust that this fee structure helps to protect our clients from potential conflicts of interest. In addition we release a section of packages for our clients to select from such that they can look comfortable that they are getting price for money. Myth #6: All financial advisers are the same. Should not I just look the adviser at my bank branch?
There are financial advisers, and then there exists financial advisers. Whilst it's true that all financial planners in Australia should be authorised below a financial planning licence from ASIC, it is important to have knowledge of that there exists potential conflicts of interest that shall arise by seeking the services of a financial adviser who is connected to a large institution – be that a bank or other financial institution. Why? Financial advisers who are component of financial institutions who release their own financial products (eg. life insurance and investments) shall likely be restricted to a tiny selection of products that they can release their clients. This means that whether you went to Bank XYZ seeking advice and the financial planner at Bank XYZ identified that you need income protection – it is likely that they will be restricted by the XYZ Bank to only give you with advice to obtain an XYZ Income Protection policy. The difficulty is that your XYZ financial adviser may have knowledge of that an improved policy for your situation should be provided to you by ABC Life Insurance, but due to the fact that they can be component regarding the XYZ institution, they can not release this policy to you.
The good news is that not all financial advisers in Australia are component of large corporations and that is why are better can give you with a wider selection of investment and insurance products from a section of providers in Australia. These financial advisers tend to be known as "boutique" or "privately-owned" financial planning firms as ASIC restricts the use regarding the phrase "independent". These tiny boutique financial advisory firms are within the minority as many have been bought out by the larger institutions and not ever have the massive monetary resources of their competitors, but they can be out there and can release you good financial advice. Financial Spectrum is one such privately-owned financial planning firm based within the Sydney CBD.
Thursday, 29 March 2012
Financial Inclusion and Poverty Reduction
2.0 CONCERNS ABOUT POVERTY As we got ready to done first 1/2 regarding the decade regarding the 1990s, growing concerns about poverty stood out in political agendas all over the industrialized and the developing worlds within Zambia. The stubbornness of poverty, even within the richest of nations, is being met with increasing impatience, and governments of diverse ideological persuasions are trying to do something about it, while donors and other worldwide agencies have been rushed into offering their help to these efforts. This has even been hastened by the deepening global financial and economic crisis that is sweeping the entire globe. But, from good intentions to actual successful remedies there is an extended way. Thus, most conceptualizers and practitioners are once repeatedly receiving note of for operational approaches to deal with poverty. And so, the old question of credit extension re-emerges which hinges on financial inclusion. Financial inclusion plays a critical role in reducing poverty. But with this financial crisis blowing throughout the globe is financial inclusion possible? Cross sectional data have shown that people with access to credit have fewer incidence of poverty. As we well know, the extent to which the reduction of poverty and/or the alleviation of its consequences was an worldwide policy issue which has differed significantly throughout countries and over time. In Zambia, for example, poverty was at the top regarding the nation's agenda during the preparation of Poverty Reduction Strategy Cardboard which saw the place qualify to Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative program steered by the Worldwide Monetary Fund. One regarding the key issues thought about in this cardboard was access to credit. Further, within the early 1980s, not only was poverty merely two of multiple explicit policy concerns, but many chose instead to highlight the counterproductive nature and high fiscal costs of some regarding the poverty alleviation programs that had been adopted earlier. More recently, as we move into the 1990s, public attention has focused repeatedly on the potential role of most government and regarding the publicly-supported non-government organizations (NGOs) in directly alleviating the continuing plight regarding the poor. 3 decades ago, as new programs were being introduced and old programs were being expanded, an optimistic view prevailed. The belief was that if stable economic growth should be maintained, government actions should actually solve the poverty difficulty if only sufficient resources were devoted to the task (Danziger and Weinberg). It is against this backdrop that some countries have return up with a deliberate vision of promoting sustainable financial service providers to the unbanked nationals with emphasis on the provisions of little interest rates. 3.0 FINANCIAL INCLUSION AND POVERTY Within the letter of transmittal regarding the 1964 Economic Report regarding the President, President Johnson announced: “We have knowledge of what should be done and this Nation of Abundance can surely afford to do it” (Johnson). Soon optimism was followed, however, by a diminishing faith within the government's ability to solve any difficulty (Aaron) and by tough arguments that corporate problems cannot be solved by “throwing cash at them.” This is one regarding the perceptions that led to promotion regarding the private sector, but together with the recent economic crisis, we have seen the USA Government increasingly receiving up its role that was negated to the private sector. Despite this skepticism, within the 1990s the pendulum of public opinion was swinging return and new initiatives to address the challenge of poverty are being proposed. In general, between these recent initiatives, specialized credit programs for the poor are becoming increasingly well-known (Jordan; Minsky et al.). As many know that a more effective creation regarding the poverty alleviation programs should prevent their earlier shortcomings, it becomes critical to identify lessons learned from earlier experiments. What do we have knowledge of about more effective program designs? As skills development accumulates on the performance of credit (and of Income from a country, Costa Rica, where these objectives of renewed growth with improved corporate conditions are being achieved barely successfully, and thus we are optimists about well-designed structural adjustment programs). Hence the need to encourage microfinance institutions such that many people shall have access to credit any time they need so. This is how financial inclusion should be promoted in poor countries. There are legal requirements that a financial service provider wants to adhere to prior to a license is granted to an institution. However it is the deliberate policy of most central banks to relax little of these legal requirements so as to maximize the numbers regarding the players within the market, mostly those whose operational objectives is to give the unbanked. In this case, this shall positively affect one the fundamentals of economics, demand and supply. Once there exists more financial service providers, this shall subsequently increase competition, leading to fall in interest rates, the cost of money. Distant there is need to return up with other programs explicitly drafted to assist the poor, in this regard there is need to take stock of all antipoverty policies that have worked and which have not. We need complimentary policies that shall help on the promotion of financial inclusion. The Government should return in and return up with fiscal policies that shall lessen the hurdles that applicants in financial service face. The tax regime should be favorable to all players within the market whose objective is to give the poor people. In this case, in addition to encouraging formal financial service providers, the place shall promote informal players as well. A substantial abode of skills development (positive and negative) on credit programs for the poor was accumulated in little income countries. Many regarding the lessons learned are relevant for any place wishing to pursue this deliberate policy. The evolution of public policy has not been different in other developing nations, where poverty is so conspicuous. Leaving behind the “basic needs” paradigm regarding the 1970s, for most regarding the developing world within the 1980s were a “decade of structural adjustment,” dominated by stabilization efforts drafted to bring local expenditure in line with local income (or output) as well as by attempts to increase local income, through policy reforms that have promoted a more efficient use of resources (Grootaert and Kanbur). There is a tough professional consensus that these adjustment programs regarding the 1980s were successful in moving many countries toward internal and external macroeconomic balance. Together with the attainment of this objective we need to avail all the credit resources that the poor desperate need. The debate is intense, however, about whether these objectives should have been achieved “while better protecting the poor and providing the basis to incorporate them within the growth process.” However, let it be emphasized that, this is not the location to solve this issue. To begin with, establishing causality between specific policies and the evolution regarding the standards of living of different socio-economic groups is a particularly difficult exercise. This shall also be the case, of course, of attempts to establish the impact of credit programs on final beneficiaries (Rhyne). Within the case of structural adjustment efforts, in any case, the outcome depends strongly on the initial conditions and on the categories of policies adopted. In any case, regardless of whether the observed poverty outcomes regarding the 1980s stemmed from past policies which militated against growth or from the adjustment policies that inevitably followed as the earlier strategies failed (Morley), there is no doubt that most low-income place governments and worldwide donors have been increasingly concerned with poverty alleviation. There exists 3 dimensions to this preoccupation. A first kind of concern relates to the need to achieve growth with equity over the long term. This requires policies and programs that foster the participation regarding the poor within the process of economic growth, by creating employment opportunities and by increasing their access to income-generating assets; and by raising the productivity of their assets, most physical and person (Grootaert and Kanbur). We know that, if efficiently provided, financial services shall play an important role in this task of incorporating (some of) the poor to processes of economic growth in most poor countries. A 2nd kind of concern relates to the need to mitigate the transitional price of adjustment for the highest many vulnerable groups of society. We know formal financial services can play a very limited role in this effort, if any. Other fiscal mechanisms give a more cost-effective approach to assist those unfortunate who have no productive opportunities and, therefore, no debt capacity. The use of credit in this case carries an excessive corporate price and is with no problems counterproductive, as one should not need to burden the unviable with more debt they cannot repay (Adams). In dealing with these (poverty) issues it is always difficult to bridge the gap between moral obligations, calling for private and public charity, on the one hand, and the economic requirements that should improve the lot regarding the poor, on the other (Schultz). It appears, nevertheless, that financial services can hold a sustainable economic role only within the 2nd case. In this case it is our desire that to encourage more players in informalfinancial services, any place and regulating authorities need to relax some requirements on governance and prudential issues when the opportunities for improvement do exist. To understand howcome this is the case, one wants to appreciate the nature of finance and the importance of its economic contributions as distant as economic development, particularly poverty reduction is concerned. 4.0 FUNCTIONS OF FINANCE The financial system is a key component regarding the institutional infrastructure that is compulsory for the efficient procedure of all markets. The highest many important contribution regarding the financial system is its ability to induce a larger volume and foster a greater degree of integration regarding the markets for provision of goods and services, factors of production, and other assets. This expansion of markets is a precondition for powerful processes of division of labor and specialization, greater competition, the use of technological technologies, and the exploitation of economies of scale and of economies of scope. As already noted by Adam Smith, these are the processes that increase the productivity of available resources and lead to economic growth. With economic growth there exists multiplier effects that spill off to poverty reduction. The expansion and integration of markets is achieved through the provision of monetization services and the efficient management regarding the payments system, the development of services of intermediation between surplus and deficit economics agents, and the establishment of opportunities for the accumulation of stores of value, the management of liquidity, and the transformation, sharing, pooling, and diversification of risk (Long). Particularly important are the services of financial intermediation, which transfer purchasing power from agents with resources in excess of those wanted to take advantage of their own (internal) opportunities (surplus agents, for example savers), to those with better opportunities but not enough resources of their own (deficit agents, for example investors). This is critical for financial inclusiveness. By creating this division of labor between savers and investors possible, financial intermediaries channel resources from producers, activities, and regions with a limited growth potential to those where a more rapid expansion of output is possible. Since there always are more economic agents who claim that they have superior uses for resources than there is purchasing power available, financial markets should contribute to the selection regarding the greatest likely uses of resources. These markets should possibly release monitoring services, ensuring that funds are profitably used, as promised, and they can contribute to the enforcement of contracts, creating sure that the people who have borrowed repay the loans (Stiglitz). This is where regulators for example central banks return into play. Subsequent to all, finance is about promises to pay within the future that are expected to be fulfilled. If this is not handled properly the consequences are disastrous, like the current economic crisis that has its roots in poor regulation regarding the financial sector. The conditions of such repayment influence, in turn, who bears what risks. We cannot sufficiently emphasize the extent to which the efficient provision of financial services is extremely critical for the procedure regarding the economy at large. Due to the fact that financial markets essentially influence the allocation of resources, Stiglitz has compared them to the “brain” regarding the entire economic system, the central locus of decision making: if they fail. . .the performance regarding the entire economic system should be impaired. Howcome this is the case is a complex question, but if it is indeed so, there is clearly a primary corporate interest at stake here. Most governments have recognized this and many have gone to extremes sequential to prevent a collapse of their e&l insurance systems. Frequently, however, while recognizing but (mis)understanding their powers, governments have intervened in financial markets, within the pursuit of a varied section of worthy nonfinancial objectives, but with negative consequences. We need to ponder through as regulators that is why to mitigate this competing wants of positive and negative consequences when coming up with financial inclusion vision. 5.0 FINANCE AND POVERTY: LESSONS FROM THE PAST A good no. regarding the initiatives to directly assist the poor with financial services (may) fall below this category of unsuccessful interventions. In considering such interventions, moreover, a key question to address is their potential price in terms regarding the reduced efficiency regarding the financial system at large. This is a price that it may be worth enduring, if the expected benefits were sufficiently large. Unfortunately, this is typically not the case, provided the very nature of financial markets. According to Gonzalez-Vega this is one regarding the highest many important lessons learned from earlier attempts to use formal financial markets to ostensibly promote specific activities, to compensate producers for other repressive policies, to free them from the grip of moneylenders, or to redistribute income towards the poor (Gonzalez-Vega 1993). The subsidized interest rates and administrative loan allocations through targeted credit programs, used for these purposes, did not displace informal sources of financial services and hardly promoted anything. They only redistributed income, but in reverse, from poor to wealthy (Gonzalez-Vega 1984). So, despite the greatest of intentions, they frequently turned out to be harmful for the specific segments regarding the population (marginal clientele) they had been set out to help. Like a country, that is why we need a concise visionary action to stay away from redistribution of income from the poor to the rich. This is common where commercial lenders together with the high pegged interest rates are targeting the poor exploitatively.
These outcomes are well known and have been extensively documented for dozens of countries (Adams et al.). Too many effort was spent in mini farmer credit programs, for example, to obtain meager results. The primary objective of increasing the farmers' access to formal credit was poorly met and a reduction within the price of borrowing was achieved only for a little larger borrowers in most poor countries. Despite artificially little interest rates, formal credit did not grow to non-pricey for mini rural producers and most credit portfolios became concentrated in a little hands. Even in stagnant economies, nevertheless, finance plays a role in consumption smoothing. This role is frequently performed well by informal financial arrangements (Udry). More importantly, these government-sponsored credit programs distracted attention from technological innovation, infrastructure development, and person capital formation, which directly increase the productivity of resources. Finance, instead, can only contribute to this goal indirectly, by creating it likely for some to take advantage regarding the opportunities created by those other growth-inducing processes. Within the absence of such opportunities, however, there is only a limited role for finance to play. There is an increasing body of evidence confirming that economic growth and reductions in poverty leave paw in hand. Clearly, a substantial improvement in living standards requires economic growth (Biggs et al.). Further, securing full participation regarding the poor in such process is a long-term effort and it involves improving their employability, expanding the educational opportunities for their children, improving the performance of labor markets, creating a hospitable environment for their productive activities and many more. An efficient provision regarding the financial services that they demand is component (but only a part) of all of this process. So, to the question “Can financial services be used to assist the poor in improving their lot?” the answer is “only when finance is allowed to do what finance is supposed to do.” That is, only when: (a) finance allows a transfer of purchasing power from uses with little to uses with high marginal rates of return; (b) finance contributes to more efficient inter-temporal decisions about saving, the accumulation of assets, and investment; (c) finance creates likely a fewer costly management of liquidity and accumulation of stores of value; and (d) finance offers better ways to deal together with the risks implicit in economic activities. Otherwise, financial interventions (such as the early subsidized and targeted credit programs) are a weak instrument to achieve different, non-financial objectives and frequently lead to unexpectedly negative outcomes (Gonzalez-Vega, 1994). This section should be summarized together with the proposition that many components are wanted for the poor to return out of poverty and that credit is only two of them. Credit is an important ingredient, but it is not even the highest many important one. Financial services play the key role of facilitating the work of growth-promoting forces, but only when the opportunities exist. In this case the poor also need saving facilities as it is one regarding the highest many important ways of storing their value. That is why poor countries should encourage deposit receiving MFIs for this objective to be fully met. 6.0 LESSONS LEARNED ABOUT LOANS AND DEPOSITS As alluded to above, a 2nd important lesson learned from accumulated skills development is that, between financial services, credit is not the only one that is important for the poor. In particular, deposit facilities give valuable services for liquidity management and for the accumulation of stores of price by poor firm-households. Researchers are always surprised by the intensity regarding the demand for deposit facilities within the rural regions of very poor countries (Gonzalez-Vega et al.). According Robinson, to satisfaction of this demand was a distinctive feature of programs that have been successful in delivering financial services to the poor (Robinson). An outstanding example is the unit desa program regarding the Bank Rakyat Indonesia, with over 12,000,000 mini depositors for only over 2,000,000 mini borrowers (Patten and Rosengard). Thus, while not all producers demand loans and, between those in need the majority wants saving facilities. Between others, we need to emphasize the importance of payments services, particularly for remittances and other cash transfers In this regard financial inclusion should be approached in a holistic manner. We fully agree that a payments service is another important service for the poor. That is why payment system should collaborate well with saving and provision of credit for the full attainment of financial inclusion. Empirical evidence clearly demonstrates that the poor not ever demand credit all regarding the time, most (if not all) economic agents demand deposit and other facilities for liquidity management and reserve accumulation, all regarding the time. A third lesson from direct skills development is that the demand for credit is not just a demand for loanable funds. Finance is intimately linked to inter-temporal decisions, and in this sense it plays a critical role not only in savings and investment processes but also in dealing together with the lack of synchronization between income generating (production) and spending activities (consumption and input use decisions), as well. Finance shall also be closely associated with risk management. It facilitates the accumulation of reserves for precautionary reasons (to be can survive emergencies) and for speculative purposes (to be can take advantage of unexpected future opportunities). For this, being creditworthy is critical. Being creditworthy is equivalent to possessing a credit reserve: poor people not ever necessarily need a loan now; they need the opportunity to obtain one, if and when they need it (Baker). They need this potential access to a loan to be reliable, to result in a timely and flexible disbursement of funds, to be always there. According to studies finding, due to the fact that the informal sources of credit do release these opportunities, poor people are reluctant to substitute formal sources of funds, no reason how subsidized, for the flexible and reliable informal financial arrangements that have served them well over the years. Thus, what matters is not just access to loanable funds (credit) but the development of an established credit relationship. This, in turn, implies a sense of permanency regarding the financial institution. A fourth lesson learned, in this connection, is that a financial intermediary cannot be restricted to credit provision alone but to institutional framework support. 7.0 INSTITUTIONAL VIABILITY AND THE POOR With every program we have learned that the highest many severe deficiency regarding the earlier interventions to give financial services to the poor was the lack of institutional viability regarding the organizations that were created for that purpose. For instance, howcome does viability reason so much? The concern with viability springs first from a clean recognition regarding the scarcity of resources. If resources are limited, without self-sufficient financial institutions there is little hope for reaching the numbers of poor firm-households that are potential borrowers and depositors. The amounts compulsory are beyond the ability and willingness of governments and donors to give them (Otero and Rhyne). We therefore, as poor nations need to guard against weak prospective financial services within the system to compliment government and donors’ efforts. The alternative to viable organizations are expensive, unviable quasi-fiscal programs that reach only a selected little beneficiaries. Thus, viability matters the highest many from this equity perspective: to be can reach higher than just a privileged few. Moreover, if the objective were just a one-time (transitory) injection of funds, then lump-sum transfers are always a more efficient method of accomplishing this. If, on the other hand, sustainability is important, then the viability regarding the financial organization matters. Further, in addition to being fiscally feasible, the highest many important contribution of a concern with institutional viability is that it elicits appropriate incentives between all the participants in financial transactions. Thus, for example, while poor loan recovery rapidly destroys viability, an image of viability improves repayment discipline. A reputation like a good borrower in an established intermediary-client relationship is a more valuable intangible asset if the financial institution is expected to be permanent rather than transitory. When this intangible asset is sufficiently valuable, it elicits punctual repayment. When the organization's survival is questioned, on the other hand, default follows in stampede, and institutional breakdown becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Viability matters when repayment matters. Therefore, there is tough need to make sure that that borrowers hold a good credit culture. This is where a tough credit reference service is imperatively wanted to enhance good credit culture. In this way, a concern with viability creates it likely to identify one method how interest rates and default rates are linked. Too little interest rates that cause intermediary losses are perceived by borrowers as signals of lack of permanency and thus delinquency follows.. Moreover, within the similar to method that very high interest rates shall induce adverse selection (Stiglitz and Weiss), too little rates tend to attract rent seekers who eventually default (Gonzalez-Vega 1993). Thus, most too high and too little interest rates shall reduce expected intermediary profits through higher expected default rates. There is need to strike a balance, to make sure that real interest rates strike a balance As another example, the targeting of loan uses, irrelevant due to the fact that regarding the fungibility of funds (Von Pischke and Adams), basically increases most lender and borrower transaction costs and reduces the quality regarding the services supplied by the intermediary and thus lowers the price regarding the intermediary-client relationship. In summary, targeting hurts viability in multiple ways. It reduces the scope for portfolio diversification in already highly specialized lenders. It limits the lender's degrees of freedom in screening loan applicants, and it reduces incentives for vigorous loan collection, shifting accountability for default from the lender to the donor that conditions the availability of funds to their use for specific targets (Aguilera-Alfred and Gonzalez-Vega). Findings reveal that compliance together with the targeting becomes imperatively difficult, for an extended time many donors ignored this potential impact of targeting on delinquency, but they were very surprised when rampant default destroyed the institutions that had been (ab)used to with no problems channel donor funds. Deposit mobilization, on the other hand, is not an easy task. It requires an appropriate organizational design, liability management techniques, and prudential supervision to protect depositors. You that is why want a tough and resilient regulator. Finally, deposit mobilization shall also be intimately linked to the importance of institutional viability. Deposits give facts to the lender regarding the potential borrowers, make a basis of mutual trust, and facilitate the accumulation of a below payment that can give like a deductible in any future loan contract. Deposits contribute, therefore, to the solution of difficult facts problems frequently encountered in financial markets. Moreover, well deposit mobilization creates an image of institutional viability that promotes repayment. Thus, while donor-funded loans shall not be repaid, those funded together with the neighbor's deposits are (Aguilera-Alfred andGonzalez-Vega). Most importantly, depositors make institutional independence from the whims of donors and politicians; they shield the financial organization from political intrusion (Poyo, Gonzalez-Vega and Aguilera-Alfred). In general, deposit mobilization contributes to sustainability and to an organizational environment (corporate culture) where permanency becomes an important (compatible) incentive to attract and retain competent managers and induce the agency's staff to behave in ways compatible together with the viability of organization. For them, the price of their relationship together with the organization increases when deposits are an important source of funds. This encourages correct decisions and effort (Chaves 1993). 8.0 FORMAL AND INFORMAL FINANCE Against this backdrop as poor countries formulate financial inclusion vision and strategy they need to recapitulate the following into consideration that: (a) The poor need higher than just financial services; the non-financial components of growth and development matter; (b) The poor need higher than just credit; deposit facilities shall reason even more. (c) The poor need higher than just loanable funds; they need a permanent, flexible and reliable credit relationship; (d) In consequence, the poor need viable, efficient, profitable, well-managed financial intermediaries with which to establish these permanent relationships. 9.0 OBSERVATIONS One important more lesson increasingly learned over the past decades is that informal financial arrangements are pervasive and very successful in providing multiple (some) categories of financial services between the poor (Bouman and Hospes). They can be timely, reliable, and levy little transaction costs on their clients, mostly for loans of mini amounts and at brief terms. The price and importance of these informal financial arrangements have been increasingly recognized and visions of exploitation have been replaced by attempts to neither replicate their features or link informal lenders to local financial networks (Adams and Fitchett). But, as Hugo Pirela has asked “if this is the case, howcome should more (semi-formal and formal) financial intermediaries be wanted to do a job that indigenous, informal arrangements are already doing to well?” The fact is that, despite their valuable contributions, informal financial arrangements suffer from multiple limitations. These shortcomings stem from the very features that make informal transactions competitive within first place. They can be grounded within the regional economy and are thereby limited hence the need to formalize them in shape of microfinance institutions. Moreover, successful finance requires inputs for screening loan applicants (information management for creditworthiness evaluation and loan approval), for monitoring borrowers, and for the efficient creation and enforcement of contracts. These costs are a function of distance (geographic, occupational, and ethnic) and of feasible technologies used to make these services. In addition, alternative technological arrangements result in specific comparative advantages within the provision of financial services in specific market niches. The decision of appropriate technology thus becomes critical. Many technological progress has taken location within the region of microfinance (Christen, Rhyne, and Vogel). The key to success is to creation an intervention that is properly dimensioned to the volume regarding the market and compatible together with the nature regarding the clientele (Chaves and Gonzalez-Vega). General banking technology, for example, is prohibitively expensive for loans to the poor in real terms. Most lender and borrower transaction costs are too high in this case. Moreover, as the poor are so heterogeneous, so are the financial services that they demand, creating opportunities for different categories of intermediaries. Commercial banks may, of course, adopt more information-intensive technologies than those that rely on general collateral; that is, embark on “downgrading” strategies (Krahnen and Schmidt). This adaptation of commercial banks’ technology of extending loans is clearly receiving a centre stage in Zambia. We have seen very many of banks extending microfinance services to the public, but this is explicitly available to the elite. Consequently there exists primary advantages in creating use of banks as intermediaries, to reach marginal clientele they need a technological revolution. Other non-bank organizations shall possess comparative advantages in facts and contract enforcement between this clientele. They shall eventually be “upgraded” to grow to more like banks. In neither case, the challenge is to bring together the people who have the informational and enforcement advantages (usually regional agents) and those with sufficient resources and willingness. Appropriate technology is clearly a compulsory condition for reaching the poor with sustainable financial services. It is not a sufficient condition, however. While policies, procedures and technologies matter, policies shall not be enacted, procedures shall not be revised, and technologies shall not be adopted, unless it is in someone's interest to do so. Within the end, all decisions are created by individuals, who pursue their own objective functions, provided existing constraints. Institutions constrain lone behavior, define property rights and incentives, and embody the rules regarding the play (North). Organizational creation matters very many due to the fact that lone choices are induced and/or constrained by the structure of incentives within the organization. Organizational creation is critical due to the fact that it influences behavior and behavior influences performance. If what matters is not just loanable funds but viable organizations, emphasis on designing efficient and viable organizations is critical. The dilemma is that a flood of donor and government funds tends to destroy adequate organizational designs. Due to the fact that wealth constraints matter, how to overcome those constraints without at the similar to time destroying the intermediary involved is a primary challenge. It seems that the highest many difficult remaining question within the provision of financial services to the poor is thus the creation of organizations together with the correct structure of incentives and governance rules (Chaves 1994). As this depends so many on the structure of property rights regarding the organization, there exists serious questions regarding the extent to which intermediaries with diffused property rights structures (such as the old public development banks and the new NGOs) or with conflicting governance rules (such as credit cooperatives) should be can generate sustainable financial intermediation. The greatest challenge for the progress of finance for the poor, therefore, is within the institutional creation of such organizations. This is, according to Krahnen and Schmidt, the highest many promising and critical region for future donor assistance. Moreover, due to the fact that of multiple limitations of locally-based financial arrangements (limited opportunities for risk diversification and intermediation), appropriate links regarding the regional intermediaries to the aggregate financial system should be established, sequential to increase the viability of enforcement-effective and informationally-advantaged agents, which shall suffer from local, covariant, systemic risks and from limited opportunities for intermediation between surplus and deficit units. Ultimately, what matters is the development of financial processes and networks (e.g., new ways of economic organization). As markets grow and institutions are developed, formality shall increase (although informality shall not disappear), and the introduction of technological institutions should be required. For this, appropriate policies, cost-effective technologies, and viable organizational designs shall still be needed. 10.0 CONCLUSION That is why the vision regarding the poor countries in promoting this concept of financial inclusion in poverty reduction need to focus on the concerns about poverty raised in this paper;the relationship between financial inclusion and poverty, functions of finance, finance and poverty: lessons from the past, lessons learned about loans and deposits, institutional viability and the poor, formal and informal finance and lastly the relevant observations created in this paper. REFERENCES Aaron, Henry (1978), Politics and the Professors: The Best Society in Perspective, Washington,D.C.: Brookings Institution. Adams, Dale W (1994), “Altruistic or Production Finance?: A Donor's Dilemma,” Economics and Sociology Occasional Cardboard No. 2150, Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State University. Adams, Dale W and Delbert A. Fitchett (eds.), (1992), Informal Finance in Low-Income Countries, Boulder, Co.: Westview Press. Adams, Dale W, Douglas H. Graham, and J.D. Von Pischke (eds.), (1984), Undermining Rural Development with Non-pricey Credit, Boulder, Co.: Westview Press. Aguilera-Alfred, Nelson and Claudio Gonzalez-Vega (1993), “A Multinomial Logit Analysis of Loan Targeting and Repayment at the Agricultural Development Bank regarding the Dominican Republic,” Agricultural Finance Review, Vol. 53: 55-64. Baker, Chester (1973), “Role of Credit within the Economic Development of Mini Farm Agriculture,” Mini Farmer Credit Analytical Papers, Washington, D.C.: Agency for Worldwide Development Spring Review of Mini Farmer Credit. Biggs, Tyler, Merilee S. Grindle and Donald R. Snodgrass (1988), “The Informal Sector, Policy Reform, and Structural Transformation,” in Jerry Jenkins (ed.), Beyond the Informal Sector. Within the Excluded in Developing Countries, San Francisco, Ca.: Institutefor Contemporary Studies. Bouman, F.J.A. and Otto Hospes (eds.) (1994), Financial Landscapes Reconstructed. The Fine Art of Mapping Development, Boulder, Co.: Westview Press. Chaves, Rodrigo A. (1994), “The Behavior and Performance of Credit Cooperatives: An Analysis of Cooperative Governance Rules,” Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State University. Chaves, Rodrigo A. and Claudio Gonzalez-Vega (1994b), “The creation of Successful Rural Financial Intermediaries: Evidence from Indonesia,” World Development, forthcoming. Christen, Robert Peck, Elisabeth Rhyne and Robert C. Vogel (1994), “Maximizing the Outreach of Microenterprise Finance: The Emerging Lessons of Successful Programs,” Washington, D.C.: IMCC, unpublished report. Danziger, Sheldon H. and Daniel H. Weinberg (1986), “Introduction,” in Sheldon H. Danzigerand Daniel H. Weinberg (eds.), Fighting Poverty. What Works and What Doesn't,Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Gonzalez-Vega Claudio (1984), “Cheap Agricultural Credit: Redistribution in Reverse,” in Dale W Adams, Douglas H. Graham, and J.D. Von Pischke (eds.), Undermining Rural Development with Non-pricey Credit, Boulder, Co.: Westview Press. Gonzalez-Vega, Claudio (1993), “From Policies, to Technologies, to Organizations: The Evolution of The Ohio State University Vision of Rural Financial Markets,” Economics and Sociology Occasional Cardboard No. 2062, Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State University. Gonzalez-Vega, Claudio (1994), “Stages within the Evolution of Thought on Rural Finance. A Vision from The Ohio State University,” Economics and Sociology Occasional Cardboard No. 2134, Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State University. Gonzalez-Vega, Claudio, Jose Alfredo Guerrero, Archibaldo Vasquez and Cameron Thraen (1992), “La Demanda por Servicios de Depósito en las Regions Rurales de la República Dominicana,”in Claudio Gonzalez-Vega (ed.), República Dominicana: Mercados Financieros Rurales y Mouilización de Depósitos, Santo Domingo: The Ohio State University. Grootaert, Christiaan and Ravi Kanbur (1990), “Policy-Oriented Analysis of Poverty and the Corporate Dimensions of Structural Adjustment,” Washington, D.C.: The World Bank SDAWorking Paper. Harrington, Michael (1962), The Other America: Poverty within the United States, New York:MacMillan. Jensen, Michael C. and William H. Meckling (1976), “Theory regarding the Firm, Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure,” Journal of Financial Economics, 3:305-360. Johnson, Lyndon (1964), “Letter of Transmittal,” in Economic Report regarding the President, Washington, D.C.: GPO. Jordan, Jerry L. (1993), “Community Lending and Economic Development,” Economic Commentary, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, November. Krahnen, Jan Pieter and Reinhard H. Schmidt (1994), Development Finance as Institution Building. An Special Approach to Poverty-Oriented Banking, Boulder, Co.: Westview Press. Christen, Robert Peck, Elisabeth Rhyne and Robert C. Vogel (1994), “Maximizing the Outreach of Microenterprise Finance: The Emerging Lessons of Successful Programs,” Washington, D.C.: IMCC, unpublished report. Danziger, Sheldon H. and Daniel H. Weinberg (1986), “Introduction,” in Sheldon H. Danziger and Daniel H. Weinberg (eds.), Fighting Poverty. What Works and What Doesn't,Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Gonzalez-Vega Claudio (1984), “Cheap Agricultural Credit: Redistribution in Reverse,” in Dale W Adams, Douglas H. Graham, and J.D. Von Pischke (eds.), Undermining Rural Development with Non-pricey Credit, Boulder, Co.: Westview Press. Gonzalez-Vega, Claudio (1993), “From Policies, to Technologies, to Organizations: The Evolution of The Ohio State University Vision of Rural Financial Markets,” Economics and Sociology Occasional Cardboard No. 2062, Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State University. Gonzalez-Vega, Claudio (1994), “Stages within the Evolution of Thought on Rural Finance. A Vision from The Ohio State University,” Economics and Sociology Occasional Cardboard No. 2134, Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State University. Gonzalez-Vega, Claudio, Jose Alfredo Guerrero, Archibaldo Vasquez and Cameron Thraen(1992), “La Demanda por Servicios de Depósito en las Regions Rurales de la República Dominicana,”in Claudio Gonzalez-Vega (ed.), República Dominicana: Mercados Financieros Rurales y Mouilización de Depósitos, Santo Domingo: The Ohio State University. Grootaert, Christiaan and Ravi Kanbur (1990), “Policy-Oriented Analysis of Poverty and the Corporate Dimensions of Structural Adjustment,” Washington, D.C.: The World Bank SDA Working Paper. Harrington, Michael (1962), The Other America: Poverty within the United States, New York:MacMillan. Jensen, Michael C. and William H. Meckling (1976), “Theory regarding the Firm, Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure,” Journal of Financial Economics, 3:305-360. Johnson, Lyndon (1964), “Letter of Transmittal,” in Economic Report regarding the President, Washington, D.C.: GPO. Jordan, Jerry L. (1993), “Community Lending and Economic Development,” Economic Commentary,Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, November. Krahnen, Jan Pieter and Reinhard H. Schmidt (1994), Development Finance as Institution Building.A New Approach to Poverty-Oriented Banking, Boulder, Co.: Westview Press. Robinson, Marguerite S. (1994), “Financial Intermediation at the Regional Level: Lessons from Indonesia,” Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Institute for Worldwide Development, Development Discussion Cardboard No. 482. Robinson, Marguerite S. (1994), “Savings Mobilization and Microenterprise Finance: The Indonesian Experience,” in Maria Otero and Elisabeth Rhyne (eds.), The New World of Microenterprise Finance. Building Well Financial Institutions for the Poor, West Hartford, Conn.: Kumarian Press. Shultz, Theodore W. (1992), “Foreword,” in Tarsicio Costañeda, Combatting Poverty. Innovative Corporate Reforms in Chile During the 1980s, San Francisco, Ca.: Worldwide Center for Economic Growth. Stiglitz, Joseph E. (1993), “The Role regarding the State in Financial Markets,” Proceeding regarding the World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics. Stiglitz, Joseph E. and Andrew Weiss (1981), “Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information,”American Economic Review, Vol. 71, No. 3: 393-410. Udry, Christopher (1990), “Credit Markets in Northern Nigeria: Credit as Insurance in a Rural Economy,” The World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 251-71. Von Pischke, J.D. (1991), Finance at the Frontier. Debt Capacity and the Role of Credit in thePrivate Economy, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. Von Pischke, J.D. and Dale W Adams (1983), “Fungibility and the Creation and Evaluation of Agricultural Credit Project,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 62, No.4, November.
These outcomes are well known and have been extensively documented for dozens of countries (Adams et al.). Too many effort was spent in mini farmer credit programs, for example, to obtain meager results. The primary objective of increasing the farmers' access to formal credit was poorly met and a reduction within the price of borrowing was achieved only for a little larger borrowers in most poor countries. Despite artificially little interest rates, formal credit did not grow to non-pricey for mini rural producers and most credit portfolios became concentrated in a little hands. Even in stagnant economies, nevertheless, finance plays a role in consumption smoothing. This role is frequently performed well by informal financial arrangements (Udry). More importantly, these government-sponsored credit programs distracted attention from technological innovation, infrastructure development, and person capital formation, which directly increase the productivity of resources. Finance, instead, can only contribute to this goal indirectly, by creating it likely for some to take advantage regarding the opportunities created by those other growth-inducing processes. Within the absence of such opportunities, however, there is only a limited role for finance to play. There is an increasing body of evidence confirming that economic growth and reductions in poverty leave paw in hand. Clearly, a substantial improvement in living standards requires economic growth (Biggs et al.). Further, securing full participation regarding the poor in such process is a long-term effort and it involves improving their employability, expanding the educational opportunities for their children, improving the performance of labor markets, creating a hospitable environment for their productive activities and many more. An efficient provision regarding the financial services that they demand is component (but only a part) of all of this process. So, to the question “Can financial services be used to assist the poor in improving their lot?” the answer is “only when finance is allowed to do what finance is supposed to do.” That is, only when: (a) finance allows a transfer of purchasing power from uses with little to uses with high marginal rates of return; (b) finance contributes to more efficient inter-temporal decisions about saving, the accumulation of assets, and investment; (c) finance creates likely a fewer costly management of liquidity and accumulation of stores of value; and (d) finance offers better ways to deal together with the risks implicit in economic activities. Otherwise, financial interventions (such as the early subsidized and targeted credit programs) are a weak instrument to achieve different, non-financial objectives and frequently lead to unexpectedly negative outcomes (Gonzalez-Vega, 1994). This section should be summarized together with the proposition that many components are wanted for the poor to return out of poverty and that credit is only two of them. Credit is an important ingredient, but it is not even the highest many important one. Financial services play the key role of facilitating the work of growth-promoting forces, but only when the opportunities exist. In this case the poor also need saving facilities as it is one regarding the highest many important ways of storing their value. That is why poor countries should encourage deposit receiving MFIs for this objective to be fully met. 6.0 LESSONS LEARNED ABOUT LOANS AND DEPOSITS As alluded to above, a 2nd important lesson learned from accumulated skills development is that, between financial services, credit is not the only one that is important for the poor. In particular, deposit facilities give valuable services for liquidity management and for the accumulation of stores of price by poor firm-households. Researchers are always surprised by the intensity regarding the demand for deposit facilities within the rural regions of very poor countries (Gonzalez-Vega et al.). According Robinson, to satisfaction of this demand was a distinctive feature of programs that have been successful in delivering financial services to the poor (Robinson). An outstanding example is the unit desa program regarding the Bank Rakyat Indonesia, with over 12,000,000 mini depositors for only over 2,000,000 mini borrowers (Patten and Rosengard). Thus, while not all producers demand loans and, between those in need the majority wants saving facilities. Between others, we need to emphasize the importance of payments services, particularly for remittances and other cash transfers In this regard financial inclusion should be approached in a holistic manner. We fully agree that a payments service is another important service for the poor. That is why payment system should collaborate well with saving and provision of credit for the full attainment of financial inclusion. Empirical evidence clearly demonstrates that the poor not ever demand credit all regarding the time, most (if not all) economic agents demand deposit and other facilities for liquidity management and reserve accumulation, all regarding the time. A third lesson from direct skills development is that the demand for credit is not just a demand for loanable funds. Finance is intimately linked to inter-temporal decisions, and in this sense it plays a critical role not only in savings and investment processes but also in dealing together with the lack of synchronization between income generating (production) and spending activities (consumption and input use decisions), as well. Finance shall also be closely associated with risk management. It facilitates the accumulation of reserves for precautionary reasons (to be can survive emergencies) and for speculative purposes (to be can take advantage of unexpected future opportunities). For this, being creditworthy is critical. Being creditworthy is equivalent to possessing a credit reserve: poor people not ever necessarily need a loan now; they need the opportunity to obtain one, if and when they need it (Baker). They need this potential access to a loan to be reliable, to result in a timely and flexible disbursement of funds, to be always there. According to studies finding, due to the fact that the informal sources of credit do release these opportunities, poor people are reluctant to substitute formal sources of funds, no reason how subsidized, for the flexible and reliable informal financial arrangements that have served them well over the years. Thus, what matters is not just access to loanable funds (credit) but the development of an established credit relationship. This, in turn, implies a sense of permanency regarding the financial institution. A fourth lesson learned, in this connection, is that a financial intermediary cannot be restricted to credit provision alone but to institutional framework support. 7.0 INSTITUTIONAL VIABILITY AND THE POOR With every program we have learned that the highest many severe deficiency regarding the earlier interventions to give financial services to the poor was the lack of institutional viability regarding the organizations that were created for that purpose. For instance, howcome does viability reason so much? The concern with viability springs first from a clean recognition regarding the scarcity of resources. If resources are limited, without self-sufficient financial institutions there is little hope for reaching the numbers of poor firm-households that are potential borrowers and depositors. The amounts compulsory are beyond the ability and willingness of governments and donors to give them (Otero and Rhyne). We therefore, as poor nations need to guard against weak prospective financial services within the system to compliment government and donors’ efforts. The alternative to viable organizations are expensive, unviable quasi-fiscal programs that reach only a selected little beneficiaries. Thus, viability matters the highest many from this equity perspective: to be can reach higher than just a privileged few. Moreover, if the objective were just a one-time (transitory) injection of funds, then lump-sum transfers are always a more efficient method of accomplishing this. If, on the other hand, sustainability is important, then the viability regarding the financial organization matters. Further, in addition to being fiscally feasible, the highest many important contribution of a concern with institutional viability is that it elicits appropriate incentives between all the participants in financial transactions. Thus, for example, while poor loan recovery rapidly destroys viability, an image of viability improves repayment discipline. A reputation like a good borrower in an established intermediary-client relationship is a more valuable intangible asset if the financial institution is expected to be permanent rather than transitory. When this intangible asset is sufficiently valuable, it elicits punctual repayment. When the organization's survival is questioned, on the other hand, default follows in stampede, and institutional breakdown becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Viability matters when repayment matters. Therefore, there is tough need to make sure that that borrowers hold a good credit culture. This is where a tough credit reference service is imperatively wanted to enhance good credit culture. In this way, a concern with viability creates it likely to identify one method how interest rates and default rates are linked. Too little interest rates that cause intermediary losses are perceived by borrowers as signals of lack of permanency and thus delinquency follows.. Moreover, within the similar to method that very high interest rates shall induce adverse selection (Stiglitz and Weiss), too little rates tend to attract rent seekers who eventually default (Gonzalez-Vega 1993). Thus, most too high and too little interest rates shall reduce expected intermediary profits through higher expected default rates. There is need to strike a balance, to make sure that real interest rates strike a balance As another example, the targeting of loan uses, irrelevant due to the fact that regarding the fungibility of funds (Von Pischke and Adams), basically increases most lender and borrower transaction costs and reduces the quality regarding the services supplied by the intermediary and thus lowers the price regarding the intermediary-client relationship. In summary, targeting hurts viability in multiple ways. It reduces the scope for portfolio diversification in already highly specialized lenders. It limits the lender's degrees of freedom in screening loan applicants, and it reduces incentives for vigorous loan collection, shifting accountability for default from the lender to the donor that conditions the availability of funds to their use for specific targets (Aguilera-Alfred and Gonzalez-Vega). Findings reveal that compliance together with the targeting becomes imperatively difficult, for an extended time many donors ignored this potential impact of targeting on delinquency, but they were very surprised when rampant default destroyed the institutions that had been (ab)used to with no problems channel donor funds. Deposit mobilization, on the other hand, is not an easy task. It requires an appropriate organizational design, liability management techniques, and prudential supervision to protect depositors. You that is why want a tough and resilient regulator. Finally, deposit mobilization shall also be intimately linked to the importance of institutional viability. Deposits give facts to the lender regarding the potential borrowers, make a basis of mutual trust, and facilitate the accumulation of a below payment that can give like a deductible in any future loan contract. Deposits contribute, therefore, to the solution of difficult facts problems frequently encountered in financial markets. Moreover, well deposit mobilization creates an image of institutional viability that promotes repayment. Thus, while donor-funded loans shall not be repaid, those funded together with the neighbor's deposits are (Aguilera-Alfred andGonzalez-Vega). Most importantly, depositors make institutional independence from the whims of donors and politicians; they shield the financial organization from political intrusion (Poyo, Gonzalez-Vega and Aguilera-Alfred). In general, deposit mobilization contributes to sustainability and to an organizational environment (corporate culture) where permanency becomes an important (compatible) incentive to attract and retain competent managers and induce the agency's staff to behave in ways compatible together with the viability of organization. For them, the price of their relationship together with the organization increases when deposits are an important source of funds. This encourages correct decisions and effort (Chaves 1993). 8.0 FORMAL AND INFORMAL FINANCE Against this backdrop as poor countries formulate financial inclusion vision and strategy they need to recapitulate the following into consideration that: (a) The poor need higher than just financial services; the non-financial components of growth and development matter; (b) The poor need higher than just credit; deposit facilities shall reason even more. (c) The poor need higher than just loanable funds; they need a permanent, flexible and reliable credit relationship; (d) In consequence, the poor need viable, efficient, profitable, well-managed financial intermediaries with which to establish these permanent relationships. 9.0 OBSERVATIONS One important more lesson increasingly learned over the past decades is that informal financial arrangements are pervasive and very successful in providing multiple (some) categories of financial services between the poor (Bouman and Hospes). They can be timely, reliable, and levy little transaction costs on their clients, mostly for loans of mini amounts and at brief terms. The price and importance of these informal financial arrangements have been increasingly recognized and visions of exploitation have been replaced by attempts to neither replicate their features or link informal lenders to local financial networks (Adams and Fitchett). But, as Hugo Pirela has asked “if this is the case, howcome should more (semi-formal and formal) financial intermediaries be wanted to do a job that indigenous, informal arrangements are already doing to well?” The fact is that, despite their valuable contributions, informal financial arrangements suffer from multiple limitations. These shortcomings stem from the very features that make informal transactions competitive within first place. They can be grounded within the regional economy and are thereby limited hence the need to formalize them in shape of microfinance institutions. Moreover, successful finance requires inputs for screening loan applicants (information management for creditworthiness evaluation and loan approval), for monitoring borrowers, and for the efficient creation and enforcement of contracts. These costs are a function of distance (geographic, occupational, and ethnic) and of feasible technologies used to make these services. In addition, alternative technological arrangements result in specific comparative advantages within the provision of financial services in specific market niches. The decision of appropriate technology thus becomes critical. Many technological progress has taken location within the region of microfinance (Christen, Rhyne, and Vogel). The key to success is to creation an intervention that is properly dimensioned to the volume regarding the market and compatible together with the nature regarding the clientele (Chaves and Gonzalez-Vega). General banking technology, for example, is prohibitively expensive for loans to the poor in real terms. Most lender and borrower transaction costs are too high in this case. Moreover, as the poor are so heterogeneous, so are the financial services that they demand, creating opportunities for different categories of intermediaries. Commercial banks may, of course, adopt more information-intensive technologies than those that rely on general collateral; that is, embark on “downgrading” strategies (Krahnen and Schmidt). This adaptation of commercial banks’ technology of extending loans is clearly receiving a centre stage in Zambia. We have seen very many of banks extending microfinance services to the public, but this is explicitly available to the elite. Consequently there exists primary advantages in creating use of banks as intermediaries, to reach marginal clientele they need a technological revolution. Other non-bank organizations shall possess comparative advantages in facts and contract enforcement between this clientele. They shall eventually be “upgraded” to grow to more like banks. In neither case, the challenge is to bring together the people who have the informational and enforcement advantages (usually regional agents) and those with sufficient resources and willingness. Appropriate technology is clearly a compulsory condition for reaching the poor with sustainable financial services. It is not a sufficient condition, however. While policies, procedures and technologies matter, policies shall not be enacted, procedures shall not be revised, and technologies shall not be adopted, unless it is in someone's interest to do so. Within the end, all decisions are created by individuals, who pursue their own objective functions, provided existing constraints. Institutions constrain lone behavior, define property rights and incentives, and embody the rules regarding the play (North). Organizational creation matters very many due to the fact that lone choices are induced and/or constrained by the structure of incentives within the organization. Organizational creation is critical due to the fact that it influences behavior and behavior influences performance. If what matters is not just loanable funds but viable organizations, emphasis on designing efficient and viable organizations is critical. The dilemma is that a flood of donor and government funds tends to destroy adequate organizational designs. Due to the fact that wealth constraints matter, how to overcome those constraints without at the similar to time destroying the intermediary involved is a primary challenge. It seems that the highest many difficult remaining question within the provision of financial services to the poor is thus the creation of organizations together with the correct structure of incentives and governance rules (Chaves 1994). As this depends so many on the structure of property rights regarding the organization, there exists serious questions regarding the extent to which intermediaries with diffused property rights structures (such as the old public development banks and the new NGOs) or with conflicting governance rules (such as credit cooperatives) should be can generate sustainable financial intermediation. The greatest challenge for the progress of finance for the poor, therefore, is within the institutional creation of such organizations. This is, according to Krahnen and Schmidt, the highest many promising and critical region for future donor assistance. Moreover, due to the fact that of multiple limitations of locally-based financial arrangements (limited opportunities for risk diversification and intermediation), appropriate links regarding the regional intermediaries to the aggregate financial system should be established, sequential to increase the viability of enforcement-effective and informationally-advantaged agents, which shall suffer from local, covariant, systemic risks and from limited opportunities for intermediation between surplus and deficit units. Ultimately, what matters is the development of financial processes and networks (e.g., new ways of economic organization). As markets grow and institutions are developed, formality shall increase (although informality shall not disappear), and the introduction of technological institutions should be required. For this, appropriate policies, cost-effective technologies, and viable organizational designs shall still be needed. 10.0 CONCLUSION That is why the vision regarding the poor countries in promoting this concept of financial inclusion in poverty reduction need to focus on the concerns about poverty raised in this paper;the relationship between financial inclusion and poverty, functions of finance, finance and poverty: lessons from the past, lessons learned about loans and deposits, institutional viability and the poor, formal and informal finance and lastly the relevant observations created in this paper. REFERENCES Aaron, Henry (1978), Politics and the Professors: The Best Society in Perspective, Washington,D.C.: Brookings Institution. Adams, Dale W (1994), “Altruistic or Production Finance?: A Donor's Dilemma,” Economics and Sociology Occasional Cardboard No. 2150, Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State University. Adams, Dale W and Delbert A. Fitchett (eds.), (1992), Informal Finance in Low-Income Countries, Boulder, Co.: Westview Press. Adams, Dale W, Douglas H. Graham, and J.D. Von Pischke (eds.), (1984), Undermining Rural Development with Non-pricey Credit, Boulder, Co.: Westview Press. Aguilera-Alfred, Nelson and Claudio Gonzalez-Vega (1993), “A Multinomial Logit Analysis of Loan Targeting and Repayment at the Agricultural Development Bank regarding the Dominican Republic,” Agricultural Finance Review, Vol. 53: 55-64. Baker, Chester (1973), “Role of Credit within the Economic Development of Mini Farm Agriculture,” Mini Farmer Credit Analytical Papers, Washington, D.C.: Agency for Worldwide Development Spring Review of Mini Farmer Credit. Biggs, Tyler, Merilee S. Grindle and Donald R. Snodgrass (1988), “The Informal Sector, Policy Reform, and Structural Transformation,” in Jerry Jenkins (ed.), Beyond the Informal Sector. Within the Excluded in Developing Countries, San Francisco, Ca.: Institutefor Contemporary Studies. Bouman, F.J.A. and Otto Hospes (eds.) (1994), Financial Landscapes Reconstructed. The Fine Art of Mapping Development, Boulder, Co.: Westview Press. Chaves, Rodrigo A. (1994), “The Behavior and Performance of Credit Cooperatives: An Analysis of Cooperative Governance Rules,” Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State University. Chaves, Rodrigo A. and Claudio Gonzalez-Vega (1994b), “The creation of Successful Rural Financial Intermediaries: Evidence from Indonesia,” World Development, forthcoming. Christen, Robert Peck, Elisabeth Rhyne and Robert C. Vogel (1994), “Maximizing the Outreach of Microenterprise Finance: The Emerging Lessons of Successful Programs,” Washington, D.C.: IMCC, unpublished report. Danziger, Sheldon H. and Daniel H. Weinberg (1986), “Introduction,” in Sheldon H. Danzigerand Daniel H. Weinberg (eds.), Fighting Poverty. What Works and What Doesn't,Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Gonzalez-Vega Claudio (1984), “Cheap Agricultural Credit: Redistribution in Reverse,” in Dale W Adams, Douglas H. Graham, and J.D. Von Pischke (eds.), Undermining Rural Development with Non-pricey Credit, Boulder, Co.: Westview Press. Gonzalez-Vega, Claudio (1993), “From Policies, to Technologies, to Organizations: The Evolution of The Ohio State University Vision of Rural Financial Markets,” Economics and Sociology Occasional Cardboard No. 2062, Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State University. Gonzalez-Vega, Claudio (1994), “Stages within the Evolution of Thought on Rural Finance. A Vision from The Ohio State University,” Economics and Sociology Occasional Cardboard No. 2134, Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State University. Gonzalez-Vega, Claudio, Jose Alfredo Guerrero, Archibaldo Vasquez and Cameron Thraen (1992), “La Demanda por Servicios de Depósito en las Regions Rurales de la República Dominicana,”in Claudio Gonzalez-Vega (ed.), República Dominicana: Mercados Financieros Rurales y Mouilización de Depósitos, Santo Domingo: The Ohio State University. Grootaert, Christiaan and Ravi Kanbur (1990), “Policy-Oriented Analysis of Poverty and the Corporate Dimensions of Structural Adjustment,” Washington, D.C.: The World Bank SDAWorking Paper. Harrington, Michael (1962), The Other America: Poverty within the United States, New York:MacMillan. Jensen, Michael C. and William H. Meckling (1976), “Theory regarding the Firm, Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure,” Journal of Financial Economics, 3:305-360. Johnson, Lyndon (1964), “Letter of Transmittal,” in Economic Report regarding the President, Washington, D.C.: GPO. Jordan, Jerry L. (1993), “Community Lending and Economic Development,” Economic Commentary, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, November. Krahnen, Jan Pieter and Reinhard H. Schmidt (1994), Development Finance as Institution Building. An Special Approach to Poverty-Oriented Banking, Boulder, Co.: Westview Press. Christen, Robert Peck, Elisabeth Rhyne and Robert C. Vogel (1994), “Maximizing the Outreach of Microenterprise Finance: The Emerging Lessons of Successful Programs,” Washington, D.C.: IMCC, unpublished report. Danziger, Sheldon H. and Daniel H. Weinberg (1986), “Introduction,” in Sheldon H. Danziger and Daniel H. Weinberg (eds.), Fighting Poverty. What Works and What Doesn't,Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Gonzalez-Vega Claudio (1984), “Cheap Agricultural Credit: Redistribution in Reverse,” in Dale W Adams, Douglas H. Graham, and J.D. Von Pischke (eds.), Undermining Rural Development with Non-pricey Credit, Boulder, Co.: Westview Press. Gonzalez-Vega, Claudio (1993), “From Policies, to Technologies, to Organizations: The Evolution of The Ohio State University Vision of Rural Financial Markets,” Economics and Sociology Occasional Cardboard No. 2062, Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State University. Gonzalez-Vega, Claudio (1994), “Stages within the Evolution of Thought on Rural Finance. A Vision from The Ohio State University,” Economics and Sociology Occasional Cardboard No. 2134, Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State University. Gonzalez-Vega, Claudio, Jose Alfredo Guerrero, Archibaldo Vasquez and Cameron Thraen(1992), “La Demanda por Servicios de Depósito en las Regions Rurales de la República Dominicana,”in Claudio Gonzalez-Vega (ed.), República Dominicana: Mercados Financieros Rurales y Mouilización de Depósitos, Santo Domingo: The Ohio State University. Grootaert, Christiaan and Ravi Kanbur (1990), “Policy-Oriented Analysis of Poverty and the Corporate Dimensions of Structural Adjustment,” Washington, D.C.: The World Bank SDA Working Paper. Harrington, Michael (1962), The Other America: Poverty within the United States, New York:MacMillan. Jensen, Michael C. and William H. Meckling (1976), “Theory regarding the Firm, Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure,” Journal of Financial Economics, 3:305-360. Johnson, Lyndon (1964), “Letter of Transmittal,” in Economic Report regarding the President, Washington, D.C.: GPO. Jordan, Jerry L. (1993), “Community Lending and Economic Development,” Economic Commentary,Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, November. Krahnen, Jan Pieter and Reinhard H. Schmidt (1994), Development Finance as Institution Building.A New Approach to Poverty-Oriented Banking, Boulder, Co.: Westview Press. Robinson, Marguerite S. (1994), “Financial Intermediation at the Regional Level: Lessons from Indonesia,” Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Institute for Worldwide Development, Development Discussion Cardboard No. 482. Robinson, Marguerite S. (1994), “Savings Mobilization and Microenterprise Finance: The Indonesian Experience,” in Maria Otero and Elisabeth Rhyne (eds.), The New World of Microenterprise Finance. Building Well Financial Institutions for the Poor, West Hartford, Conn.: Kumarian Press. Shultz, Theodore W. (1992), “Foreword,” in Tarsicio Costañeda, Combatting Poverty. Innovative Corporate Reforms in Chile During the 1980s, San Francisco, Ca.: Worldwide Center for Economic Growth. Stiglitz, Joseph E. (1993), “The Role regarding the State in Financial Markets,” Proceeding regarding the World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics. Stiglitz, Joseph E. and Andrew Weiss (1981), “Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information,”American Economic Review, Vol. 71, No. 3: 393-410. Udry, Christopher (1990), “Credit Markets in Northern Nigeria: Credit as Insurance in a Rural Economy,” The World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 251-71. Von Pischke, J.D. (1991), Finance at the Frontier. Debt Capacity and the Role of Credit in thePrivate Economy, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. Von Pischke, J.D. and Dale W Adams (1983), “Fungibility and the Creation and Evaluation of Agricultural Credit Project,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 62, No.4, November.
Wednesday, 28 March 2012
Financial Planning requires deep knowledge, hire a financial planner or financial adviser
As they speak "save money and money shall keep you", but saving money involves some techniques sequential to keep on taxes and other expenditure. Financial Planning is not only limited to just saving money but it covers tax shield, learning planning, cash flow management, investment planning, retirement planning, risk management and insurance planning, estate planning , tax planning, business succession planning.Financial planning requires an in-depth knowledge of law and regulations related to financial transaction and income as the base of any financial planning is governing regulations and current financial policies within the country. These financial regulations hold on changing on standard basis and one wants to hold track regarding the similar to sequential to apply the similar to in financial planning process. Be advised to consult any financial planner for your financial planning process. As financial planner or financial advisor is a practicing professional who rabbit insurance with different personal financial issues through real planning and management. Financial adviser has detailed knowledge of government regulations and grants which shall be helpful within the process of financial planning.How to Start? Financial planning starts with setting up a goal, for example if your monthly income is 5000 bugs then what percentage of this money you should like to keep in minimum risk venture like banks and what no. of money should be exposed to high risk venture like stock and shares this decision depends on your current and future wants for money. Any financial planner should examine the current and future need and financial obligations regarding the clients. Financial Planner should analyse different investment and insurance policies sequential to cope together with the clients' requirements.
Financial planning together with the help of a financial planner or financial adviser should not think about an overhead as it shall keep money and can give extreme benefits within the future. Many people who were facing anxiety of fulfilling their financial obligations earlier look peace of mind subsequent to consulting a financial planner or advisor. Many businesses take professional opinion of financial advisors on standard basis or they hire any financial planner to manage all their assets and liabilities such that business owners can focus on other parts of business also. Financial planning involves different sequenced steps sequential to make this process successful and beneficial. First step starts with deciding the long and brief term financial obligations regarding the client and deciding the current quantity wants to be invested to pay such obligations. Another large aspect is of risk management, people often need high position of returns with little no. of risk associated. Subsequently any financial planner of financial advisor shall have knowledge of that risk and return sprint direct proportionally. There is sure many financial method to stay away from any undue risk associated together with the investment and little financial tools like mutual funds and ULIPS shall be thought about fairly good investment choice to any investor. Subsequently financial planner should look in to the client's willingness and position of risk acceptance. People often invest their money in high risk venture expecting an above return on the similar to but in case of any loss they blame financial planner that is totally incorrect and in appropriate. Financial planners should also take real consent prior to creating any venture with high position of risks associated. Financial planning release businesses space for future and protect them against the harsh conditions regarding the economy and in business they speak "If you fail to plan, you procedure to fail".
Financial planning together with the help of a financial planner or financial adviser should not think about an overhead as it shall keep money and can give extreme benefits within the future. Many people who were facing anxiety of fulfilling their financial obligations earlier look peace of mind subsequent to consulting a financial planner or advisor. Many businesses take professional opinion of financial advisors on standard basis or they hire any financial planner to manage all their assets and liabilities such that business owners can focus on other parts of business also. Financial planning involves different sequenced steps sequential to make this process successful and beneficial. First step starts with deciding the long and brief term financial obligations regarding the client and deciding the current quantity wants to be invested to pay such obligations. Another large aspect is of risk management, people often need high position of returns with little no. of risk associated. Subsequently any financial planner of financial advisor shall have knowledge of that risk and return sprint direct proportionally. There is sure many financial method to stay away from any undue risk associated together with the investment and little financial tools like mutual funds and ULIPS shall be thought about fairly good investment choice to any investor. Subsequently financial planner should look in to the client's willingness and position of risk acceptance. People often invest their money in high risk venture expecting an above return on the similar to but in case of any loss they blame financial planner that is totally incorrect and in appropriate. Financial planners should also take real consent prior to creating any venture with high position of risks associated. Financial planning release businesses space for future and protect them against the harsh conditions regarding the economy and in business they speak "If you fail to plan, you procedure to fail".
Tuesday, 27 March 2012
World Financial Team Business Rep Talks About Dreaming Big
World e&l insurance Team business representative Ed Mylett recently published an story on the force of thinking big, that is something about which any ambitious person should stand to learn an item or two. Like a member of his company's Chairman's Council, Mylett has worked hard to achieve his status and appreciates the large dreams he once had, which have now been realized. There is nothing more important than imagination, as Mylett quotes Einstein as possessing spoke about – even knowledge. While every successful person has a fair no. of knowledge, that isn't enough if there isn't a large imagination and the ability to dream large to leave along with it. How to Ponder Large for Success in Business – and Life So how does one use the force of imagination to one's advantage? It's obvious that people have been creating use of their imaginations to move humanity forward for as long as we have inhabited the earth, but nowadays it may seem that everything likely has already been imagined. But the truth is that imagination is the only method to improve on what we have, and the only method to improve what is going on in your life. One example Mylett gives involves airlines, as he is a frequent traveler for World Financial Team business trips. When he stops and thinks related to the efficiency regarding the airlines, considering the millions of people who return through every primary airport regarding the world, he is taken aback by the imagination that all the inventors, engineers and other visionaries had to have sequential to make this system.
If it weren't for the imagination of people like Leonardo da Vinci, who drew some regarding the earliest sketches of flying machines, nothing within the technological airline sector should exist today. So even when your dreams seem far-fetched, it still pays off to dream them and work toward them. If those dreams do not return to fruition in your lifetime, it still will not be a waste of time. Regarding to Mylett, imagination is at its most dynamic spot when people are can shape mental images of things that do not yet exist. There is force in these images and they attract us to the projects, people, and things that we should be passionate about. So whatever your business is or whatever goals you can have, do not be afraid to dream big. Whether your goal is to be a success within the financial/business world like Mylett or any other endeavor in life, this kind of attitude can not ever hurt.
If it weren't for the imagination of people like Leonardo da Vinci, who drew some regarding the earliest sketches of flying machines, nothing within the technological airline sector should exist today. So even when your dreams seem far-fetched, it still pays off to dream them and work toward them. If those dreams do not return to fruition in your lifetime, it still will not be a waste of time. Regarding to Mylett, imagination is at its most dynamic spot when people are can shape mental images of things that do not yet exist. There is force in these images and they attract us to the projects, people, and things that we should be passionate about. So whatever your business is or whatever goals you can have, do not be afraid to dream big. Whether your goal is to be a success within the financial/business world like Mylett or any other endeavor in life, this kind of attitude can not ever hurt.
Monday, 26 March 2012
Be Honest About Your Financial Situation
In our book, The 4th position of compare holiday insurance Freedom (Level 3 - Get Real), we teach readers how to transform their financial destiny. First you should beginning by being honest about your situation. Honesty is the greatest method to total recovery. You have knowledge of to take a sober look at where you can be and the actions that lead to this spot in your life. What were the triggers that created you over spend? Ask you questions like:
Who did I read my financial habits from?
What sense of enjoyment do I receive by spending money I do not have?
Do I provide money when I hold a stressful day?
Do I provide money instead of dealing with my emotions?
Do I system out a budget prior to I make purchases?
By asking you hard questions for example these shall cause you to pay more attention to howcome you provide as you do. Here is an example. Whether you have knowledge of that you provide more money whenever you leave to the grocery save on an empty stomach, try eating before you leave shopping. Another suggestion is to make a list of items that you need prior to leaving home. If the item is not on your list, do not place it into your shopping cart.
By developing these habits, you will begin to teach you discipline. There are a many things you can do to replace your bad habits with good habits. Trust me; there is nothing new below the sun. You can locate a method to eliminate bad spending habits. Many people have been faced together with the same challenges you can be now experiencing and still met with success. The primary difference between them and you is that they kept trying until they located an procedure that worked greatest for them. It is not a question of whether you can do it, but shall you do it?
You are where you can be due to the fact that of your past actions. The best part about that final sentence is that as soon as you beginning taking different steps in an alternate direction, you can beginning becoming the person you desire to be. Ponder about it this way. Sometimes a person is only overweight due to the fact that regarding the bad food choices that were created within the past. Once they begin to make better food choices and exercise, their body shall begin to change almost immediately. It shall of course take some time prior to the true conclusions of their efforts are revealed. This is mostly true if they have been overeating for years. As long as the new lifestyle is maintained, it shall only be a reason of time prior to their weight loss goal is reached. The exact similar to principle applies to your finances. You can have been below in a financial hole, but you can dig you out of that hole and move on to a life of wealth and abundance!
Who did I read my financial habits from?
What sense of enjoyment do I receive by spending money I do not have?
Do I provide money when I hold a stressful day?
Do I provide money instead of dealing with my emotions?
Do I system out a budget prior to I make purchases?
By asking you hard questions for example these shall cause you to pay more attention to howcome you provide as you do. Here is an example. Whether you have knowledge of that you provide more money whenever you leave to the grocery save on an empty stomach, try eating before you leave shopping. Another suggestion is to make a list of items that you need prior to leaving home. If the item is not on your list, do not place it into your shopping cart.
By developing these habits, you will begin to teach you discipline. There are a many things you can do to replace your bad habits with good habits. Trust me; there is nothing new below the sun. You can locate a method to eliminate bad spending habits. Many people have been faced together with the same challenges you can be now experiencing and still met with success. The primary difference between them and you is that they kept trying until they located an procedure that worked greatest for them. It is not a question of whether you can do it, but shall you do it?
You are where you can be due to the fact that of your past actions. The best part about that final sentence is that as soon as you beginning taking different steps in an alternate direction, you can beginning becoming the person you desire to be. Ponder about it this way. Sometimes a person is only overweight due to the fact that regarding the bad food choices that were created within the past. Once they begin to make better food choices and exercise, their body shall begin to change almost immediately. It shall of course take some time prior to the true conclusions of their efforts are revealed. This is mostly true if they have been overeating for years. As long as the new lifestyle is maintained, it shall only be a reason of time prior to their weight loss goal is reached. The exact similar to principle applies to your finances. You can have been below in a financial hole, but you can dig you out of that hole and move on to a life of wealth and abundance!
Sunday, 25 March 2012
Financial Planner - Let The Experts Handle Your Hard Earnings
Every penny that is earned through sweat and blood is very precious for every individual. Preserving the earned cash and investing it within the right parts shall also be equally important. If the hard earned cash is not invested within the right opportunities then it shall result in huge losses. That is why it is always recommended to let the experts handle issues like these and this is where a financial planner returns in. Right Opportunities Within the busy schedule we many times miss out investing within the right opportunities as we are mostly occupied in our primary jobs. Hence it is always regarded wise to let someone who knows regarding the right investment at the right time. A certified compare holiday insurance planner not only keeps a look out on your investment portfolio but also look out for the different schemes which return in to the market from time to time. As he / she are in touch together with the final happenings within the market, they can help in suggesting the right investments.
Personalised Investments
Basically a financial planner not only manages your portfolio but also sends you the right advice regarding investing with respect to the investor's spot of view. He keeps an eye on all the investment opportunities and enjoys a trustworthy relationship together with the client as the client is investing all his earnings at the behest regarding the advisor. Hence it is always advised that whatever investments he does should be done through a certified financial planner as there is always a risk when a non experienced planner invests your money. A Career in Financial Planning Generally most people ponder twice prior to receiving finance like a subject as it involves very many of studies and as the region regarding the subject is constricted to a sure limit, it leaves the person with little scope for doing revolutionary research. In spite of possessing some many different careers to decide from, many students decide the financial planning career. This field involves very many of brain storming planning as it is very challenging to try and help somebody reach the goals they have set. This requires very many of skill, an plan regarding the market trends and good knowledge regarding the client's portfolio and his goals. It should be the endeavour regarding the planner to first and foremost the thoughts regarding the client in his mind and act in such a method by which he or she can maintain a thorough balance between the expectations regarding the client and the market trends such that the portfolio regarding the client tends to be on the rising side. Possessing financial planning career like a career requires very many of self dedication and at times decisions should be taken on the gut feeling. This kind of a career is generally advised to those people who hold a flare towards finance investments and to those that hold a background in investment planning. This is due to the fact that skills development plays a vital role in improving the decision creating in financial planning.
Personalised Investments
Basically a financial planner not only manages your portfolio but also sends you the right advice regarding investing with respect to the investor's spot of view. He keeps an eye on all the investment opportunities and enjoys a trustworthy relationship together with the client as the client is investing all his earnings at the behest regarding the advisor. Hence it is always advised that whatever investments he does should be done through a certified financial planner as there is always a risk when a non experienced planner invests your money. A Career in Financial Planning Generally most people ponder twice prior to receiving finance like a subject as it involves very many of studies and as the region regarding the subject is constricted to a sure limit, it leaves the person with little scope for doing revolutionary research. In spite of possessing some many different careers to decide from, many students decide the financial planning career. This field involves very many of brain storming planning as it is very challenging to try and help somebody reach the goals they have set. This requires very many of skill, an plan regarding the market trends and good knowledge regarding the client's portfolio and his goals. It should be the endeavour regarding the planner to first and foremost the thoughts regarding the client in his mind and act in such a method by which he or she can maintain a thorough balance between the expectations regarding the client and the market trends such that the portfolio regarding the client tends to be on the rising side. Possessing financial planning career like a career requires very many of self dedication and at times decisions should be taken on the gut feeling. This kind of a career is generally advised to those people who hold a flare towards finance investments and to those that hold a background in investment planning. This is due to the fact that skills development plays a vital role in improving the decision creating in financial planning.
Saturday, 24 March 2012
Capital Structure and Risk in Islamic Financial Services
Introduction: Information, Risks, and Capital Financial intermediation is a critical factor for growth and corporate inclusion. two of its core functions is to mobilize financial resources from surplus agents and channel them to those with deficits. It thus allows investor entrepreneurs to expand economic activity and employment opportunities. It also enables household consumers, micro- and tiny entrepreneurs to expand their own welfare and earnings opportunities, and seek to smooth their lifetime outlays. In all cases, financial intermediation drives economic growth and contributes to corporate inclusion, provided it is conducted in a sound and efficient way.[1]
A financial intermediary's ability to process details on risks and returns of investment opportunities shall hold a bearing on the soundness and efficiency of its resource mobilization and reallocation function. Conventional financial services (CFSs) process details through institutions or markets, and have generally evolved from the former to the latter. In most cases, markets and agents give alternative ways of processing details on risks and returns of investment opportunities. Within first form, the intermediary raises capital to set up business to collect generally liquid deposits from surplus agents and reallocates these resources, now in his trust, to ones with deficits in generally fewer liquid assets. Within the 2nd form, surplus agents purchase directly financial assets that represent a debt of a deficit agent or an ownership share in its business. In neither approach, most categories of agents engage in transactions on the basis of trust and of expectations related to the degree of liquidity that should give the option to re-contract at a reasonable cost.[2] Within the case of banks, the trust should be seen as based on proprietary information. Within the case of markets, the details is more commoditized and widely available.[3]
Efficiently processed details can help the efficient allocation of capital. It can help a financial intermediary to better define the capital it should need to achieve the returns sought, while maintaining its ability to face the financial consequences of unexpected events that shall endanger its stability. Banks engage in gathering and processing details on clients and markets, which allows them to manage different risks by unbundling them and reallocating the components. By performing these services soundly and efficiently, banks can manage to calibrate their capital requirements and receive diversified income streams. Thus a bank's investors and clients can gain comfort as to its reliability in allowing them to access liquidity and maintain stability. In parallel with banks, financial markets should possibly convey similar sense of access to liquidity and stability based on disclosed and broadly available details on market participants. Markets can give deficit and surplus agents a direct role in processing details to facilitate the unbundling and reallocation of risks and the efficient use of capital. Thus, banks and markets compete and complement each other in financial intermediation. The competition puts compression on single agents to use capital at their disposal efficiently, and conclusions in a system-wide improved allocation of capital resources.[4]
Institutions offering Islamic financial services (IIFSs) also process details on risks and returns of investment opportunities while complying with Shari'ah principles.[5] Thus, in principle, they should be expected to increase competition in financial details processing by inducing better risk management and capital use. Such competition should be expected over time to lead to an efficient use of capital at the position of each financial agent, whether they practice conventional or Islamic finance, and in aggregate, system-wide throughout all modes of financial intermediation. Efficient use of capital is thus a challenge which competition imposes on all financial intermediaries, whether offering Islamic financial services or conventional financial services. At similar time, Islamic financial intermediation wants to comply with Shari'ah principles, notably those of risk sharing and materiality of financial transactions. Shari'ah compliance, corporate responsibility, and the discipline of competition compound IIFSs' challenge to process details efficiently sequential to manage the risks they shall face and use their capital endowments. Thus, by their very nature and the environment in which they generally operate, IIFSs need to be well equipped with the details and skills that can let them to identify their capital resources and use them efficiently.
This chapter argues for the need for Islamic financial services to strengthen risk management practices within the process of defining their own capital requirements in accordance with their loss tolerance. It suggests that IIFSs should invest within the collection of loss details and adoption of loss data management systems. IIFSs should benefit from implementing risk management methodologies and adapting their staffing skills accordingly. The chapter starts in Section 3 by outlining views on the relationship between risk management and capital for financial intermediation. It then overviews risk categories as an initial step in risk management in Section 3. Section 5 discusses regulatory and economic capital, introducing risk occurrence frequency like a distribution probability. Section six concludes with suggestions on steps that shall help with risk management and improve the competitiveness of IIFSs. 2. Bank Capital and Risk Management Bank capital should be considered as consisting of (a) equity capital and (b) sure non-deposit liabilities or debt capital (see Section 4). It is most a means of funding earnings-generating assets and a stability cushion. From the perspective of efficiency and returns, capital is component of a bank's funding that should be applied directly to the purchase of earning assets, as well as being used like a basis for leverage to raise other funds for expanding assets with the net benefit accruing to shareholders. From a perspective of stability, bank capital is a cushion for absorbing shocks of business losses and maintaining solvency, with benefits accruing to depositors and other stakeholders. Most financial intermediaries and regulators are sensitive to the dual role of capital, like a means of funding earnings-generating assets and like a cushion for dealing with unanticipated events. Financial intermediaries shall tend to be more focused on the former role and regulators on the latter.
A bank's capital structure decision relates to the ratio of capital to deposits and to the ratio of debt capital to equity capital. Its performance, in terms of return on equity capital, should be influenced by its ability to calibrate the position of capital it requires. Through efficient risk management, it can reach a sense of which capital structure can greatest help it to: (a) achieve profitability while maintaining stability; (b) reassure markets as to the quality of its business conduct; and (c) hold a constructive dialogue with regulators.
Efficient use of capital shall help IIFSs to achieve profitability and stability. Allocating capital resources to low-performing or excessively risky assets is bound to drag below performance, endanger stability, or both. Equally, leaving capital idle entails at greatest forgoing earnings opportunities. For instance, overly cautious approaches that lead financial intermediaries to maintain larger amounts of capital than warranted by their risk profile shall not let them neither to obtain the full potential of their capital or to contribute effectively to the development regarding the communities they serve. At the other end regarding the spectrum, a financial intermediary overly eager to achieve returns shall allocate resources to highly risky assets that release high returns but endanger stability. Explicit risk management practices can help within the selection of assets to which capital and other resources are applied and calibrate the position of capital that greatest suits business objectives and stability tolerance.
The volume and composition regarding the resources that capital enables financial intermediaries to raise are likely to affect their profitability and stability. In a frictionless world where full details is available and markets are complete, the value of a firm should be independent of its capital structure, and so the focus should be on capital position and not structure.[6] Below such circumstances, the method by which a financial intermediary raises its required funds should be irrelevant. However, financial intermediaries not ever operate in a frictionless world; they face imperfections for example costs of bankruptcy and financial distress, transaction costs, asymmetric information, or taxes. They also operate within the framework of a governing regulation possibly with a deposit insurance scheme that is expected to give a safety net. In fact, one shall contend that these market imperfections are the very reason for the successful existence of banks as financial intermediaries. Accordingly, not only a financial intermediary's position of capital but also its structure is likely to bear on its market valuation, its business conduct, and its stability. Effective risk management strategies should contribute to a financial intermediary's ability to assess not homecare insurance of capital it should need in relation to assets and deposits, but also the extent to which its structure affects its value.
Market discipline contributes to responsible corporate behavior. Markets' reactions to perceptions of a financial intermediary's business conduct and capital strength should be unforgiving. It is thus within the interest of financial intermediaries to develop approaches to defining capital resource requirements that take into account the institutional environment in which they operate. The market's perception of market imperfections is likely to influence views on the appropriate position of capital and the capital adequacy of financial intermediaries. For example, the availability of a safety net shall lead market participants to be fewer demanding as to the need for capital in relation to bank assets. Conversely, anticipation of high costs of financial distress to depositors and other stakeholders shall induce market participants to require the holding of more capital proportionally to assets. Similarly, wherever the institutional environment is weak and contract enforcement is uncertain and costly, markets shall expect financial intermediaries to adapt the capital they hold.
The management of capital structure should in principle mitigate the risk of bank failures. When comparing a highly leveraged bank and a bank that is well capitalized, the leveraged bank shall likely skills development a greater loss of value during times of financial distress when the asset quality deteriorates, due to the increased risk of bankruptcy. To cope with downturns, in most countries banks hold a minimum no. of capital, based on the risk embedded in their asset holding. Accordingly, banks with relatively risky assets should hold a higher no. of capital than those banks with fewer risky assets. However, fearing the harshness of market discipline, many banks maintain a higher position of capital than the minimum required to allay the perception that they should be undercapitalized and stay away from the losses this shall induce, as witnessed within the 1980s. The key capital adequacy ratio provides an assessment of just how adequately the capital cushions such fluctuations within the bank's earnings and supports higher assets growth.
Finally, efficient risk management should let financial intermediaries to hold a constructive dialogue with regulators. It should help them to articulate their views with respect to capital needs. The regulators' rationale for regulating capital stems from the perception regarding the public-good nature of bank services, their potential macroeconomic growth and stability impact, and skills development with costly bank failures. Regarding to some estimates, such costs have varied between 3% and 55% of GDP.[7] Thus, regulators' concerns with likely systemic risk resulting from the contagion effects of bank runs lead them to seek to mitigate risks of financial distress with regulatory requirements on banks' capital.[8] Regulators' concerns should be compounded by the presence of deposit insurance schemes. The moral hazard that shall result from deposit insurance shall lead to additional regulatory requirements for example linking the position of insurance premia to the risk embedded in assets and captured in associated risk weights. Indeed, deposit insurance shall induce banks to lever up capital by expanding their own funding with liabilities, thus placing more risk on their capital and increasing their vulnerability. Efficient risk management practices should let banks to improve their dialogue with the regulator and convey more convincingly their views on their soundness and capital requirements.
Regulators should generally also be concerned with the overall impact on the economy regarding the resources raised by the financial system below their purview. From an economy-wide perspective, banks should be viewed as firms' competitors in raising capital on financial markets. The outcome of this competition has a bearing on economic performance and financial stability, and points to a cost–benefit tradeoff in holding capital. For instance, Gersbach (2007) suggests that a benefit of bank capital is the equity acting like a buffer against future losses, thereby reducing excessive risk receiving regarding the banks. At similar time, raising bank capital shall lead to a crowding out of industrial firms, limiting their access to equity and other market funding and also impacting their access to funding from banks and its cost. Furthermore, raising equity on markets shall increase the cost of banks' resources, inducing them to seek to invest in higher-yielding but more risky assets and thereby increasing their risk exposure. Thus, while potentially providing a cushion against unforeseen events, a higher position of equity shall actually induce more risk taking, notably through raising the cost of funds to banks and their clients. Efficient risk management can give inputs to most banks and regulators to better calibrate capital wants and deal with the foregoing kind of tradeoff.
The position of a financial intermediary's capital shall also hold a bearing on its ability to give liquidity. The financial intermediary provides liquidity by funding assets that should be fewer liquid than the deposit resources it collects. There is a view that requirements for higher grades of capital shall hold a negative impact on liquidity creation.[9] On the liability side, a higher capital requirement shall lead to a corresponding reduction within the position of deposits, thus constraining the ability to give liquidity. Also, higher capital requirements shall induce financial intermediaries to be more restrained in extending financing, thus constraining their ability to give liquidity. However, regarding to another view, higher capital should let the financial intermediary to make more liquidity since its risk-absorptive capacity should be improved.[10] In this regard, an empirical study concluded that for larger banks capital has a statistically significant positive net effect on liquidity creation, while for tiny banks this effect is negative.[11] Accordingly, each financial intermediary should need to evaluate carefully the position and composition regarding the capital it needs, since the latter plays a significant role in its ability to function like a liquidity provider. Equally, regulators should need to pay attention to the impact which capital requirement should have on the funding regarding the economy.
IIFS's risk management arrangements shall bear on their ability to calibrate capital to their business objectives and risk tolerance, to deal with market discipline, and to maintain a dialogue with regulators. The IIFS's characteristic of mobilizing funds within the shape of risk-sharing investment accounts in location of conventional deposits, together with the materiality[12] of financing transactions, shall alter the overall risk regarding the balance sheet and, consequently, the assessment of their capital requirements. Indeed, risk-sharing "deposits" should in principle reduce the need for a safety cushion to weather adverse investment outcomes. Similarly, the materiality of investments is likely to modify the extent of their risk and hold a bearing on the assessment for the overall need for capital; asset-based modes of finance should be fewer risky and profit-sharing modes more risky, than conventional interest-bearing modes. Nevertheless, IIFSs should operate within a regulatory framework that is likely to impose on them capital requirements with a view to promoting stability and limiting contagion risks. However, besides regulatory and market demands for IIFSs to hold capital, IIFSs need to place in location risk management assessments for their own purposes of returns and stability in accordance with the requirements of Shari'ah, their own mission statements, and the protection of their stakeholders. [1] Look Honohan (2004) and Levine (2004).
[2] Sir Paul Hicks identifies such liquidity as one regarding the first factors behind the Industrial Revolution.
[3] Actually, a deposit should be viewed like a purchase of a debt asset issued by the intermediary and redeemable at its face value.
[4] The institution–market competition is reflected within the trends of their relative market shares of total financial assets. For example, within the United States, between 1960 and the early 1990s, commercial banks' share of total financial intermediaries' assets fell from around 40% to fewer than 30%. Look Edwards (1996).
[5] They do respond to a latent demand for financial services that not ever breach Shari'ah principles. Accordingly, they have the potential to contribute to financial deepening, economic growth, and corporate inclusion. Look also Burghardt and Fuss (2004).
[6] Modigliani and Miller (1958).
[7] Look Klingebiel and Laeven (2007).
[8] Views differ on the need for and extent of regulation, as well as on the usefulness of deposit insurance; look Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2007).
[9] Diamond and Rajan (2006).
[10] Allen and Gale (2007).
[11] Berger and Bouwman (2005).
[12] By the "materiality" of financing transactions is meant that, in such transactions, capital should be "materialized" within the shape of an asset or asset services (as in Murabaha credit sales, Salam and Istisna'a financing, or Ijarah leasing), or of a business venture (Musharakah or Mudarabah). Capital within the shape of money is not entitled to any return, as this should be interest (riba).
Introduction: Information, Risks, and Capital Financial intermediation is a critical factor for growth and corporate inclusion. two of its core functions is to mobilize financial resources from surplus agents and channel them to those with deficits. It thus allows investor entrepreneurs to expand economic activity and employment opportunities. It also enables household consumers, micro- and tiny entrepreneurs to expand their own welfare and earnings opportunities, and seek to smooth their lifetime outlays. In all cases, financial intermediation drives economic growth and contributes to corporate inclusion, provided it is conducted in a sound and efficient way.[1]
A financial intermediary's ability to process details on risks and returns of investment opportunities shall hold a bearing on the soundness and efficiency of its resource mobilization and reallocation function. Conventional financial services (CFSs) process details through institutions or markets, and have generally evolved from the former to the latter. In most cases, markets and agents give alternative ways of processing details on risks and returns of investment opportunities. Within first form, the intermediary raises capital to set up business to collect generally liquid deposits from surplus agents and reallocates these resources, now in his trust, to ones with deficits in generally fewer liquid assets. Within the 2nd form, surplus agents purchase directly financial assets that represent a debt of a deficit agent or an ownership share in its business. In neither approach, most categories of agents engage in transactions on the basis of trust and of expectations related to the degree of liquidity that should give the option to re-contract at a reasonable cost.[2] Within the case of banks, the trust should be seen as based on proprietary information. Within the case of markets, the details is more commoditized and widely available.[3]
Efficiently processed details can help the efficient allocation of capital. It can help a financial intermediary to better define the capital it should need to achieve the returns sought, while maintaining its ability to face the financial consequences of unexpected events that shall endanger its stability. Banks engage in gathering and processing details on clients and markets, which allows them to manage different risks by unbundling them and reallocating the components. By performing these services soundly and efficiently, banks can manage to calibrate their capital requirements and receive diversified income streams. Thus a bank's investors and clients can gain comfort as to its reliability in allowing them to access liquidity and maintain stability. In parallel with banks, financial markets should possibly convey similar sense of access to liquidity and stability based on disclosed and broadly available details on market participants. Markets can give deficit and surplus agents a direct role in processing details to facilitate the unbundling and reallocation of risks and the efficient use of capital. Thus, banks and markets compete and complement each other in financial intermediation. The competition puts compression on single agents to use capital at their disposal efficiently, and conclusions in a system-wide improved allocation of capital resources.[4]
Institutions offering Islamic financial services (IIFSs) also process details on risks and returns of investment opportunities while complying with Shari'ah principles.[5] Thus, in principle, they should be expected to increase competition in financial details processing by inducing better risk management and capital use. Such competition should be expected over time to lead to an efficient use of capital at the position of each financial agent, whether they practice conventional or Islamic finance, and in aggregate, system-wide throughout all modes of financial intermediation. Efficient use of capital is thus a challenge which competition imposes on all financial intermediaries, whether offering Islamic financial services or conventional financial services. At similar time, Islamic financial intermediation wants to comply with Shari'ah principles, notably those of risk sharing and materiality of financial transactions. Shari'ah compliance, corporate responsibility, and the discipline of competition compound IIFSs' challenge to process details efficiently sequential to manage the risks they shall face and use their capital endowments. Thus, by their very nature and the environment in which they generally operate, IIFSs need to be well equipped with the details and skills that can let them to identify their capital resources and use them efficiently.
This chapter argues for the need for Islamic financial services to strengthen risk management practices within the process of defining their own capital requirements in accordance with their loss tolerance. It suggests that IIFSs should invest within the collection of loss details and adoption of loss data management systems. IIFSs should benefit from implementing risk management methodologies and adapting their staffing skills accordingly. The chapter starts in Section 3 by outlining views on the relationship between risk management and capital for financial intermediation. It then overviews risk categories as an initial step in risk management in Section 3. Section 5 discusses regulatory and economic capital, introducing risk occurrence frequency like a distribution probability. Section six concludes with suggestions on steps that shall help with risk management and improve the competitiveness of IIFSs. 2. Bank Capital and Risk Management Bank capital should be considered as consisting of (a) equity capital and (b) sure non-deposit liabilities or debt capital (see Section 4). It is most a means of funding earnings-generating assets and a stability cushion. From the perspective of efficiency and returns, capital is component of a bank's funding that should be applied directly to the purchase of earning assets, as well as being used like a basis for leverage to raise other funds for expanding assets with the net benefit accruing to shareholders. From a perspective of stability, bank capital is a cushion for absorbing shocks of business losses and maintaining solvency, with benefits accruing to depositors and other stakeholders. Most financial intermediaries and regulators are sensitive to the dual role of capital, like a means of funding earnings-generating assets and like a cushion for dealing with unanticipated events. Financial intermediaries shall tend to be more focused on the former role and regulators on the latter.
A bank's capital structure decision relates to the ratio of capital to deposits and to the ratio of debt capital to equity capital. Its performance, in terms of return on equity capital, should be influenced by its ability to calibrate the position of capital it requires. Through efficient risk management, it can reach a sense of which capital structure can greatest help it to: (a) achieve profitability while maintaining stability; (b) reassure markets as to the quality of its business conduct; and (c) hold a constructive dialogue with regulators.
Efficient use of capital shall help IIFSs to achieve profitability and stability. Allocating capital resources to low-performing or excessively risky assets is bound to drag below performance, endanger stability, or both. Equally, leaving capital idle entails at greatest forgoing earnings opportunities. For instance, overly cautious approaches that lead financial intermediaries to maintain larger amounts of capital than warranted by their risk profile shall not let them neither to obtain the full potential of their capital or to contribute effectively to the development regarding the communities they serve. At the other end regarding the spectrum, a financial intermediary overly eager to achieve returns shall allocate resources to highly risky assets that release high returns but endanger stability. Explicit risk management practices can help within the selection of assets to which capital and other resources are applied and calibrate the position of capital that greatest suits business objectives and stability tolerance.
The volume and composition regarding the resources that capital enables financial intermediaries to raise are likely to affect their profitability and stability. In a frictionless world where full details is available and markets are complete, the value of a firm should be independent of its capital structure, and so the focus should be on capital position and not structure.[6] Below such circumstances, the method by which a financial intermediary raises its required funds should be irrelevant. However, financial intermediaries not ever operate in a frictionless world; they face imperfections for example costs of bankruptcy and financial distress, transaction costs, asymmetric information, or taxes. They also operate within the framework of a governing regulation possibly with a deposit insurance scheme that is expected to give a safety net. In fact, one shall contend that these market imperfections are the very reason for the successful existence of banks as financial intermediaries. Accordingly, not only a financial intermediary's position of capital but also its structure is likely to bear on its market valuation, its business conduct, and its stability. Effective risk management strategies should contribute to a financial intermediary's ability to assess not only the position of capital it should need in relation to assets and deposits, but also the extent to which its structure affects its value.
Market discipline contributes to responsible corporate behavior. Markets' reactions to perceptions of a financial intermediary's business conduct and capital strength should be unforgiving. It is thus within the interest of financial intermediaries to develop approaches to defining capital resource requirements that take into account the institutional environment in which they operate. The market's perception of market imperfections is likely to influence views on the appropriate position of capital and the capital adequacy of financial intermediaries. For example, the availability of a safety net shall lead market participants to be fewer demanding as to the need for capital in relation to bank assets. Conversely, anticipation of high costs of financial distress to depositors and other stakeholders shall induce market participants to require the holding of more capital proportionally to assets. Similarly, wherever the institutional environment is weak and contract enforcement is uncertain and costly, markets shall expect financial intermediaries to adapt the capital they hold.
The management of capital structure should in principle mitigate the risk of bank failures. When comparing a highly leveraged bank and a bank that is well capitalized, the leveraged bank shall likely skills development a greater loss of value during times of financial distress when the asset quality deteriorates, due to the increased risk of bankruptcy. To cope with downturns, in most countries banks hold a minimum no. of capital, based on the risk embedded in their asset holding. Accordingly, banks with relatively risky assets should hold a higher no. of capital than those banks with fewer risky assets. However, fearing the harshness of market discipline, many banks maintain a higher position of capital than the minimum required to allay the perception that they should be undercapitalized and stay away from the losses this shall induce, as witnessed within the 1980s. The key capital adequacy ratio provides an assessment of just how adequately the capital cushions such fluctuations within the bank's earnings and supports higher assets growth.
Finally, efficient risk management should let financial intermediaries to hold a constructive dialogue with regulators. It should help them to articulate their views with respect to capital needs. The regulators' rationale for regulating capital stems from the perception regarding the public-good nature of bank services, their potential macroeconomic growth and stability impact, and skills development with costly bank failures. Regarding to some estimates, such costs have varied between 3% and 55% of GDP.[7] Thus, regulators' concerns with likely systemic risk resulting from the contagion effects of bank runs lead them to seek to mitigate risks of financial distress with regulatory requirements on banks' capital.[8] Regulators' concerns should be compounded by the presence of deposit insurance schemes. The moral hazard that shall result from deposit insurance shall lead to additional regulatory requirements for example linking the position of insurance premia to the risk embedded in assets and captured in associated risk weights. Indeed, deposit insurance shall induce banks to lever up capital by expanding their own funding with liabilities, thus placing more risk on their capital and increasing their vulnerability. Efficient risk management practices should let banks to improve their dialogue with the regulator and convey more convincingly their views on their soundness and capital requirements.
Regulators should generally also be concerned with the overall impact on the economy regarding the resources raised by the financial system below their purview. From an economy-wide perspective, banks should be viewed as firms' competitors in raising capital on financial markets. The outcome of this competition has a bearing on economic performance and financial stability, and points to a cost–benefit tradeoff in holding capital. For instance, Gersbach (2007) suggests that a benefit of bank capital is the equity acting like a buffer against future losses, thereby reducing excessive risk receiving regarding the banks. At similar time, raising bank capital shall lead to a crowding out of industrial firms, limiting their access to equity and other market funding and also impacting their access to funding from banks and its cost. Furthermore, raising equity on markets shall increase the cost of banks' resources, inducing them to seek to invest in higher-yielding but more risky assets and thereby increasing their risk exposure. Thus, while potentially providing a cushion against unforeseen events, a higher position of equity shall actually induce more risk taking, notably through raising the cost of funds to banks and their clients. Efficient risk management can give inputs to most banks and regulators to better calibrate capital wants and deal with the foregoing kind of tradeoff.
The position of a financial intermediary's capital shall also hold a bearing on its ability to give liquidity. The financial intermediary provides liquidity by funding assets that should be fewer liquid than the deposit resources it collects. There is a view that requirements for higher grades of capital shall hold a negative impact on liquidity creation.[9] On the liability side, a higher capital requirement shall lead to a corresponding reduction within the position of deposits, thus constraining the ability to give liquidity. Also, higher capital requirements shall induce financial intermediaries to be more restrained in extending financing, thus constraining their ability to give liquidity. However, regarding to another view, higher capital should let the financial intermediary to make more liquidity since its risk-absorptive capacity should be improved.[10] In this regard, an empirical study concluded that for larger banks capital has a statistically significant positive net effect on liquidity creation, while for tiny banks this effect is negative.[11] Accordingly, each financial intermediary should need to evaluate carefully the position and composition regarding the capital it needs, since the latter plays a significant role in its ability to function like a liquidity provider. Equally, regulators should need to pay attention to the impact which capital requirement should have on the funding regarding the economy.
IIFS's risk management arrangements shall bear on their ability to calibrate capital to their business objectives and risk tolerance, to deal with market discipline, and to maintain a dialogue with regulators. The IIFS's characteristic of mobilizing funds within the shape of risk-sharing investment accounts in location of conventional deposits, together with the materiality[12] of financing transactions, shall alter the overall risk regarding the balance sheet and, consequently, the assessment of their capital requirements. Indeed, risk-sharing "deposits" should in principle reduce the need for a safety cushion to weather adverse investment outcomes. Similarly, the materiality of investments is likely to modify the extent of their risk and hold a bearing on the assessment for the overall need for capital; asset-based modes of finance should be fewer risky and profit-sharing modes more risky, than conventional interest-bearing modes. Nevertheless, IIFSs should operate within a regulatory framework that is likely to impose on them capital requirements with a view to promoting stability and limiting contagion risks. However, besides regulatory and market demands for IIFSs to hold capital, IIFSs need to place in location risk management assessments for their own purposes of returns and stability in accordance with the requirements of Shari'ah, their own mission statements, and the protection of their stakeholders. [1] Look Honohan (2004) and Levine (2004).
[2] Sir Paul Hicks identifies such liquidity as one regarding the first factors behind the Industrial Revolution.
[3] Actually, a deposit should be viewed like a purchase of a debt asset issued by the intermediary and redeemable at its face value.
[4] The institution–market competition is reflected within the trends of their relative market shares of total financial assets. For example, within the United States, between 1960 and the early 1990s, commercial banks' share of total financial intermediaries' assets fell from around 40% to fewer than 30%. Look Edwards (1996).
[5] They do respond to a latent demand for financial services that not ever breach Shari'ah principles. Accordingly, they have the potential to contribute to financial deepening, economic growth, and corporate inclusion. Look also Burghardt and Fuss (2004).
[6] Modigliani and Miller (1958).
[7] Look Klingebiel and Laeven (2007).
[8] Views differ on the need for and extent of regulation, as well as on the usefulness of deposit insurance; look Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2007).
[9] Diamond and Rajan (2006).
[10] Allen and Gale (2007).
[11] Berger and Bouwman (2005).
[12] By the "materiality" of financing transactions is meant that, in such transactions, capital should be "materialized" within the shape of an asset or asset services (as in Murabaha credit sales, Salam and Istisna'a financing, or Ijarah leasing), or of a business venture (Musharakah or Mudarabah). Capital within the shape of money is not entitled to any return, as this should be interest (riba).
...... to be Cont.
A financial intermediary's ability to process details on risks and returns of investment opportunities shall hold a bearing on the soundness and efficiency of its resource mobilization and reallocation function. Conventional financial services (CFSs) process details through institutions or markets, and have generally evolved from the former to the latter. In most cases, markets and agents give alternative ways of processing details on risks and returns of investment opportunities. Within first form, the intermediary raises capital to set up business to collect generally liquid deposits from surplus agents and reallocates these resources, now in his trust, to ones with deficits in generally fewer liquid assets. Within the 2nd form, surplus agents purchase directly financial assets that represent a debt of a deficit agent or an ownership share in its business. In neither approach, most categories of agents engage in transactions on the basis of trust and of expectations related to the degree of liquidity that should give the option to re-contract at a reasonable cost.[2] Within the case of banks, the trust should be seen as based on proprietary information. Within the case of markets, the details is more commoditized and widely available.[3]
Efficiently processed details can help the efficient allocation of capital. It can help a financial intermediary to better define the capital it should need to achieve the returns sought, while maintaining its ability to face the financial consequences of unexpected events that shall endanger its stability. Banks engage in gathering and processing details on clients and markets, which allows them to manage different risks by unbundling them and reallocating the components. By performing these services soundly and efficiently, banks can manage to calibrate their capital requirements and receive diversified income streams. Thus a bank's investors and clients can gain comfort as to its reliability in allowing them to access liquidity and maintain stability. In parallel with banks, financial markets should possibly convey similar sense of access to liquidity and stability based on disclosed and broadly available details on market participants. Markets can give deficit and surplus agents a direct role in processing details to facilitate the unbundling and reallocation of risks and the efficient use of capital. Thus, banks and markets compete and complement each other in financial intermediation. The competition puts compression on single agents to use capital at their disposal efficiently, and conclusions in a system-wide improved allocation of capital resources.[4]
Institutions offering Islamic financial services (IIFSs) also process details on risks and returns of investment opportunities while complying with Shari'ah principles.[5] Thus, in principle, they should be expected to increase competition in financial details processing by inducing better risk management and capital use. Such competition should be expected over time to lead to an efficient use of capital at the position of each financial agent, whether they practice conventional or Islamic finance, and in aggregate, system-wide throughout all modes of financial intermediation. Efficient use of capital is thus a challenge which competition imposes on all financial intermediaries, whether offering Islamic financial services or conventional financial services. At similar time, Islamic financial intermediation wants to comply with Shari'ah principles, notably those of risk sharing and materiality of financial transactions. Shari'ah compliance, corporate responsibility, and the discipline of competition compound IIFSs' challenge to process details efficiently sequential to manage the risks they shall face and use their capital endowments. Thus, by their very nature and the environment in which they generally operate, IIFSs need to be well equipped with the details and skills that can let them to identify their capital resources and use them efficiently.
This chapter argues for the need for Islamic financial services to strengthen risk management practices within the process of defining their own capital requirements in accordance with their loss tolerance. It suggests that IIFSs should invest within the collection of loss details and adoption of loss data management systems. IIFSs should benefit from implementing risk management methodologies and adapting their staffing skills accordingly. The chapter starts in Section 3 by outlining views on the relationship between risk management and capital for financial intermediation. It then overviews risk categories as an initial step in risk management in Section 3. Section 5 discusses regulatory and economic capital, introducing risk occurrence frequency like a distribution probability. Section six concludes with suggestions on steps that shall help with risk management and improve the competitiveness of IIFSs. 2. Bank Capital and Risk Management Bank capital should be considered as consisting of (a) equity capital and (b) sure non-deposit liabilities or debt capital (see Section 4). It is most a means of funding earnings-generating assets and a stability cushion. From the perspective of efficiency and returns, capital is component of a bank's funding that should be applied directly to the purchase of earning assets, as well as being used like a basis for leverage to raise other funds for expanding assets with the net benefit accruing to shareholders. From a perspective of stability, bank capital is a cushion for absorbing shocks of business losses and maintaining solvency, with benefits accruing to depositors and other stakeholders. Most financial intermediaries and regulators are sensitive to the dual role of capital, like a means of funding earnings-generating assets and like a cushion for dealing with unanticipated events. Financial intermediaries shall tend to be more focused on the former role and regulators on the latter.
A bank's capital structure decision relates to the ratio of capital to deposits and to the ratio of debt capital to equity capital. Its performance, in terms of return on equity capital, should be influenced by its ability to calibrate the position of capital it requires. Through efficient risk management, it can reach a sense of which capital structure can greatest help it to: (a) achieve profitability while maintaining stability; (b) reassure markets as to the quality of its business conduct; and (c) hold a constructive dialogue with regulators.
Efficient use of capital shall help IIFSs to achieve profitability and stability. Allocating capital resources to low-performing or excessively risky assets is bound to drag below performance, endanger stability, or both. Equally, leaving capital idle entails at greatest forgoing earnings opportunities. For instance, overly cautious approaches that lead financial intermediaries to maintain larger amounts of capital than warranted by their risk profile shall not let them neither to obtain the full potential of their capital or to contribute effectively to the development regarding the communities they serve. At the other end regarding the spectrum, a financial intermediary overly eager to achieve returns shall allocate resources to highly risky assets that release high returns but endanger stability. Explicit risk management practices can help within the selection of assets to which capital and other resources are applied and calibrate the position of capital that greatest suits business objectives and stability tolerance.
The volume and composition regarding the resources that capital enables financial intermediaries to raise are likely to affect their profitability and stability. In a frictionless world where full details is available and markets are complete, the value of a firm should be independent of its capital structure, and so the focus should be on capital position and not structure.[6] Below such circumstances, the method by which a financial intermediary raises its required funds should be irrelevant. However, financial intermediaries not ever operate in a frictionless world; they face imperfections for example costs of bankruptcy and financial distress, transaction costs, asymmetric information, or taxes. They also operate within the framework of a governing regulation possibly with a deposit insurance scheme that is expected to give a safety net. In fact, one shall contend that these market imperfections are the very reason for the successful existence of banks as financial intermediaries. Accordingly, not only a financial intermediary's position of capital but also its structure is likely to bear on its market valuation, its business conduct, and its stability. Effective risk management strategies should contribute to a financial intermediary's ability to assess not homecare insurance of capital it should need in relation to assets and deposits, but also the extent to which its structure affects its value.
Market discipline contributes to responsible corporate behavior. Markets' reactions to perceptions of a financial intermediary's business conduct and capital strength should be unforgiving. It is thus within the interest of financial intermediaries to develop approaches to defining capital resource requirements that take into account the institutional environment in which they operate. The market's perception of market imperfections is likely to influence views on the appropriate position of capital and the capital adequacy of financial intermediaries. For example, the availability of a safety net shall lead market participants to be fewer demanding as to the need for capital in relation to bank assets. Conversely, anticipation of high costs of financial distress to depositors and other stakeholders shall induce market participants to require the holding of more capital proportionally to assets. Similarly, wherever the institutional environment is weak and contract enforcement is uncertain and costly, markets shall expect financial intermediaries to adapt the capital they hold.
The management of capital structure should in principle mitigate the risk of bank failures. When comparing a highly leveraged bank and a bank that is well capitalized, the leveraged bank shall likely skills development a greater loss of value during times of financial distress when the asset quality deteriorates, due to the increased risk of bankruptcy. To cope with downturns, in most countries banks hold a minimum no. of capital, based on the risk embedded in their asset holding. Accordingly, banks with relatively risky assets should hold a higher no. of capital than those banks with fewer risky assets. However, fearing the harshness of market discipline, many banks maintain a higher position of capital than the minimum required to allay the perception that they should be undercapitalized and stay away from the losses this shall induce, as witnessed within the 1980s. The key capital adequacy ratio provides an assessment of just how adequately the capital cushions such fluctuations within the bank's earnings and supports higher assets growth.
Finally, efficient risk management should let financial intermediaries to hold a constructive dialogue with regulators. It should help them to articulate their views with respect to capital needs. The regulators' rationale for regulating capital stems from the perception regarding the public-good nature of bank services, their potential macroeconomic growth and stability impact, and skills development with costly bank failures. Regarding to some estimates, such costs have varied between 3% and 55% of GDP.[7] Thus, regulators' concerns with likely systemic risk resulting from the contagion effects of bank runs lead them to seek to mitigate risks of financial distress with regulatory requirements on banks' capital.[8] Regulators' concerns should be compounded by the presence of deposit insurance schemes. The moral hazard that shall result from deposit insurance shall lead to additional regulatory requirements for example linking the position of insurance premia to the risk embedded in assets and captured in associated risk weights. Indeed, deposit insurance shall induce banks to lever up capital by expanding their own funding with liabilities, thus placing more risk on their capital and increasing their vulnerability. Efficient risk management practices should let banks to improve their dialogue with the regulator and convey more convincingly their views on their soundness and capital requirements.
Regulators should generally also be concerned with the overall impact on the economy regarding the resources raised by the financial system below their purview. From an economy-wide perspective, banks should be viewed as firms' competitors in raising capital on financial markets. The outcome of this competition has a bearing on economic performance and financial stability, and points to a cost–benefit tradeoff in holding capital. For instance, Gersbach (2007) suggests that a benefit of bank capital is the equity acting like a buffer against future losses, thereby reducing excessive risk receiving regarding the banks. At similar time, raising bank capital shall lead to a crowding out of industrial firms, limiting their access to equity and other market funding and also impacting their access to funding from banks and its cost. Furthermore, raising equity on markets shall increase the cost of banks' resources, inducing them to seek to invest in higher-yielding but more risky assets and thereby increasing their risk exposure. Thus, while potentially providing a cushion against unforeseen events, a higher position of equity shall actually induce more risk taking, notably through raising the cost of funds to banks and their clients. Efficient risk management can give inputs to most banks and regulators to better calibrate capital wants and deal with the foregoing kind of tradeoff.
The position of a financial intermediary's capital shall also hold a bearing on its ability to give liquidity. The financial intermediary provides liquidity by funding assets that should be fewer liquid than the deposit resources it collects. There is a view that requirements for higher grades of capital shall hold a negative impact on liquidity creation.[9] On the liability side, a higher capital requirement shall lead to a corresponding reduction within the position of deposits, thus constraining the ability to give liquidity. Also, higher capital requirements shall induce financial intermediaries to be more restrained in extending financing, thus constraining their ability to give liquidity. However, regarding to another view, higher capital should let the financial intermediary to make more liquidity since its risk-absorptive capacity should be improved.[10] In this regard, an empirical study concluded that for larger banks capital has a statistically significant positive net effect on liquidity creation, while for tiny banks this effect is negative.[11] Accordingly, each financial intermediary should need to evaluate carefully the position and composition regarding the capital it needs, since the latter plays a significant role in its ability to function like a liquidity provider. Equally, regulators should need to pay attention to the impact which capital requirement should have on the funding regarding the economy.
IIFS's risk management arrangements shall bear on their ability to calibrate capital to their business objectives and risk tolerance, to deal with market discipline, and to maintain a dialogue with regulators. The IIFS's characteristic of mobilizing funds within the shape of risk-sharing investment accounts in location of conventional deposits, together with the materiality[12] of financing transactions, shall alter the overall risk regarding the balance sheet and, consequently, the assessment of their capital requirements. Indeed, risk-sharing "deposits" should in principle reduce the need for a safety cushion to weather adverse investment outcomes. Similarly, the materiality of investments is likely to modify the extent of their risk and hold a bearing on the assessment for the overall need for capital; asset-based modes of finance should be fewer risky and profit-sharing modes more risky, than conventional interest-bearing modes. Nevertheless, IIFSs should operate within a regulatory framework that is likely to impose on them capital requirements with a view to promoting stability and limiting contagion risks. However, besides regulatory and market demands for IIFSs to hold capital, IIFSs need to place in location risk management assessments for their own purposes of returns and stability in accordance with the requirements of Shari'ah, their own mission statements, and the protection of their stakeholders. [1] Look Honohan (2004) and Levine (2004).
[2] Sir Paul Hicks identifies such liquidity as one regarding the first factors behind the Industrial Revolution.
[3] Actually, a deposit should be viewed like a purchase of a debt asset issued by the intermediary and redeemable at its face value.
[4] The institution–market competition is reflected within the trends of their relative market shares of total financial assets. For example, within the United States, between 1960 and the early 1990s, commercial banks' share of total financial intermediaries' assets fell from around 40% to fewer than 30%. Look Edwards (1996).
[5] They do respond to a latent demand for financial services that not ever breach Shari'ah principles. Accordingly, they have the potential to contribute to financial deepening, economic growth, and corporate inclusion. Look also Burghardt and Fuss (2004).
[6] Modigliani and Miller (1958).
[7] Look Klingebiel and Laeven (2007).
[8] Views differ on the need for and extent of regulation, as well as on the usefulness of deposit insurance; look Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2007).
[9] Diamond and Rajan (2006).
[10] Allen and Gale (2007).
[11] Berger and Bouwman (2005).
[12] By the "materiality" of financing transactions is meant that, in such transactions, capital should be "materialized" within the shape of an asset or asset services (as in Murabaha credit sales, Salam and Istisna'a financing, or Ijarah leasing), or of a business venture (Musharakah or Mudarabah). Capital within the shape of money is not entitled to any return, as this should be interest (riba).
Introduction: Information, Risks, and Capital Financial intermediation is a critical factor for growth and corporate inclusion. two of its core functions is to mobilize financial resources from surplus agents and channel them to those with deficits. It thus allows investor entrepreneurs to expand economic activity and employment opportunities. It also enables household consumers, micro- and tiny entrepreneurs to expand their own welfare and earnings opportunities, and seek to smooth their lifetime outlays. In all cases, financial intermediation drives economic growth and contributes to corporate inclusion, provided it is conducted in a sound and efficient way.[1]
A financial intermediary's ability to process details on risks and returns of investment opportunities shall hold a bearing on the soundness and efficiency of its resource mobilization and reallocation function. Conventional financial services (CFSs) process details through institutions or markets, and have generally evolved from the former to the latter. In most cases, markets and agents give alternative ways of processing details on risks and returns of investment opportunities. Within first form, the intermediary raises capital to set up business to collect generally liquid deposits from surplus agents and reallocates these resources, now in his trust, to ones with deficits in generally fewer liquid assets. Within the 2nd form, surplus agents purchase directly financial assets that represent a debt of a deficit agent or an ownership share in its business. In neither approach, most categories of agents engage in transactions on the basis of trust and of expectations related to the degree of liquidity that should give the option to re-contract at a reasonable cost.[2] Within the case of banks, the trust should be seen as based on proprietary information. Within the case of markets, the details is more commoditized and widely available.[3]
Efficiently processed details can help the efficient allocation of capital. It can help a financial intermediary to better define the capital it should need to achieve the returns sought, while maintaining its ability to face the financial consequences of unexpected events that shall endanger its stability. Banks engage in gathering and processing details on clients and markets, which allows them to manage different risks by unbundling them and reallocating the components. By performing these services soundly and efficiently, banks can manage to calibrate their capital requirements and receive diversified income streams. Thus a bank's investors and clients can gain comfort as to its reliability in allowing them to access liquidity and maintain stability. In parallel with banks, financial markets should possibly convey similar sense of access to liquidity and stability based on disclosed and broadly available details on market participants. Markets can give deficit and surplus agents a direct role in processing details to facilitate the unbundling and reallocation of risks and the efficient use of capital. Thus, banks and markets compete and complement each other in financial intermediation. The competition puts compression on single agents to use capital at their disposal efficiently, and conclusions in a system-wide improved allocation of capital resources.[4]
Institutions offering Islamic financial services (IIFSs) also process details on risks and returns of investment opportunities while complying with Shari'ah principles.[5] Thus, in principle, they should be expected to increase competition in financial details processing by inducing better risk management and capital use. Such competition should be expected over time to lead to an efficient use of capital at the position of each financial agent, whether they practice conventional or Islamic finance, and in aggregate, system-wide throughout all modes of financial intermediation. Efficient use of capital is thus a challenge which competition imposes on all financial intermediaries, whether offering Islamic financial services or conventional financial services. At similar time, Islamic financial intermediation wants to comply with Shari'ah principles, notably those of risk sharing and materiality of financial transactions. Shari'ah compliance, corporate responsibility, and the discipline of competition compound IIFSs' challenge to process details efficiently sequential to manage the risks they shall face and use their capital endowments. Thus, by their very nature and the environment in which they generally operate, IIFSs need to be well equipped with the details and skills that can let them to identify their capital resources and use them efficiently.
This chapter argues for the need for Islamic financial services to strengthen risk management practices within the process of defining their own capital requirements in accordance with their loss tolerance. It suggests that IIFSs should invest within the collection of loss details and adoption of loss data management systems. IIFSs should benefit from implementing risk management methodologies and adapting their staffing skills accordingly. The chapter starts in Section 3 by outlining views on the relationship between risk management and capital for financial intermediation. It then overviews risk categories as an initial step in risk management in Section 3. Section 5 discusses regulatory and economic capital, introducing risk occurrence frequency like a distribution probability. Section six concludes with suggestions on steps that shall help with risk management and improve the competitiveness of IIFSs. 2. Bank Capital and Risk Management Bank capital should be considered as consisting of (a) equity capital and (b) sure non-deposit liabilities or debt capital (see Section 4). It is most a means of funding earnings-generating assets and a stability cushion. From the perspective of efficiency and returns, capital is component of a bank's funding that should be applied directly to the purchase of earning assets, as well as being used like a basis for leverage to raise other funds for expanding assets with the net benefit accruing to shareholders. From a perspective of stability, bank capital is a cushion for absorbing shocks of business losses and maintaining solvency, with benefits accruing to depositors and other stakeholders. Most financial intermediaries and regulators are sensitive to the dual role of capital, like a means of funding earnings-generating assets and like a cushion for dealing with unanticipated events. Financial intermediaries shall tend to be more focused on the former role and regulators on the latter.
A bank's capital structure decision relates to the ratio of capital to deposits and to the ratio of debt capital to equity capital. Its performance, in terms of return on equity capital, should be influenced by its ability to calibrate the position of capital it requires. Through efficient risk management, it can reach a sense of which capital structure can greatest help it to: (a) achieve profitability while maintaining stability; (b) reassure markets as to the quality of its business conduct; and (c) hold a constructive dialogue with regulators.
Efficient use of capital shall help IIFSs to achieve profitability and stability. Allocating capital resources to low-performing or excessively risky assets is bound to drag below performance, endanger stability, or both. Equally, leaving capital idle entails at greatest forgoing earnings opportunities. For instance, overly cautious approaches that lead financial intermediaries to maintain larger amounts of capital than warranted by their risk profile shall not let them neither to obtain the full potential of their capital or to contribute effectively to the development regarding the communities they serve. At the other end regarding the spectrum, a financial intermediary overly eager to achieve returns shall allocate resources to highly risky assets that release high returns but endanger stability. Explicit risk management practices can help within the selection of assets to which capital and other resources are applied and calibrate the position of capital that greatest suits business objectives and stability tolerance.
The volume and composition regarding the resources that capital enables financial intermediaries to raise are likely to affect their profitability and stability. In a frictionless world where full details is available and markets are complete, the value of a firm should be independent of its capital structure, and so the focus should be on capital position and not structure.[6] Below such circumstances, the method by which a financial intermediary raises its required funds should be irrelevant. However, financial intermediaries not ever operate in a frictionless world; they face imperfections for example costs of bankruptcy and financial distress, transaction costs, asymmetric information, or taxes. They also operate within the framework of a governing regulation possibly with a deposit insurance scheme that is expected to give a safety net. In fact, one shall contend that these market imperfections are the very reason for the successful existence of banks as financial intermediaries. Accordingly, not only a financial intermediary's position of capital but also its structure is likely to bear on its market valuation, its business conduct, and its stability. Effective risk management strategies should contribute to a financial intermediary's ability to assess not only the position of capital it should need in relation to assets and deposits, but also the extent to which its structure affects its value.
Market discipline contributes to responsible corporate behavior. Markets' reactions to perceptions of a financial intermediary's business conduct and capital strength should be unforgiving. It is thus within the interest of financial intermediaries to develop approaches to defining capital resource requirements that take into account the institutional environment in which they operate. The market's perception of market imperfections is likely to influence views on the appropriate position of capital and the capital adequacy of financial intermediaries. For example, the availability of a safety net shall lead market participants to be fewer demanding as to the need for capital in relation to bank assets. Conversely, anticipation of high costs of financial distress to depositors and other stakeholders shall induce market participants to require the holding of more capital proportionally to assets. Similarly, wherever the institutional environment is weak and contract enforcement is uncertain and costly, markets shall expect financial intermediaries to adapt the capital they hold.
The management of capital structure should in principle mitigate the risk of bank failures. When comparing a highly leveraged bank and a bank that is well capitalized, the leveraged bank shall likely skills development a greater loss of value during times of financial distress when the asset quality deteriorates, due to the increased risk of bankruptcy. To cope with downturns, in most countries banks hold a minimum no. of capital, based on the risk embedded in their asset holding. Accordingly, banks with relatively risky assets should hold a higher no. of capital than those banks with fewer risky assets. However, fearing the harshness of market discipline, many banks maintain a higher position of capital than the minimum required to allay the perception that they should be undercapitalized and stay away from the losses this shall induce, as witnessed within the 1980s. The key capital adequacy ratio provides an assessment of just how adequately the capital cushions such fluctuations within the bank's earnings and supports higher assets growth.
Finally, efficient risk management should let financial intermediaries to hold a constructive dialogue with regulators. It should help them to articulate their views with respect to capital needs. The regulators' rationale for regulating capital stems from the perception regarding the public-good nature of bank services, their potential macroeconomic growth and stability impact, and skills development with costly bank failures. Regarding to some estimates, such costs have varied between 3% and 55% of GDP.[7] Thus, regulators' concerns with likely systemic risk resulting from the contagion effects of bank runs lead them to seek to mitigate risks of financial distress with regulatory requirements on banks' capital.[8] Regulators' concerns should be compounded by the presence of deposit insurance schemes. The moral hazard that shall result from deposit insurance shall lead to additional regulatory requirements for example linking the position of insurance premia to the risk embedded in assets and captured in associated risk weights. Indeed, deposit insurance shall induce banks to lever up capital by expanding their own funding with liabilities, thus placing more risk on their capital and increasing their vulnerability. Efficient risk management practices should let banks to improve their dialogue with the regulator and convey more convincingly their views on their soundness and capital requirements.
Regulators should generally also be concerned with the overall impact on the economy regarding the resources raised by the financial system below their purview. From an economy-wide perspective, banks should be viewed as firms' competitors in raising capital on financial markets. The outcome of this competition has a bearing on economic performance and financial stability, and points to a cost–benefit tradeoff in holding capital. For instance, Gersbach (2007) suggests that a benefit of bank capital is the equity acting like a buffer against future losses, thereby reducing excessive risk receiving regarding the banks. At similar time, raising bank capital shall lead to a crowding out of industrial firms, limiting their access to equity and other market funding and also impacting their access to funding from banks and its cost. Furthermore, raising equity on markets shall increase the cost of banks' resources, inducing them to seek to invest in higher-yielding but more risky assets and thereby increasing their risk exposure. Thus, while potentially providing a cushion against unforeseen events, a higher position of equity shall actually induce more risk taking, notably through raising the cost of funds to banks and their clients. Efficient risk management can give inputs to most banks and regulators to better calibrate capital wants and deal with the foregoing kind of tradeoff.
The position of a financial intermediary's capital shall also hold a bearing on its ability to give liquidity. The financial intermediary provides liquidity by funding assets that should be fewer liquid than the deposit resources it collects. There is a view that requirements for higher grades of capital shall hold a negative impact on liquidity creation.[9] On the liability side, a higher capital requirement shall lead to a corresponding reduction within the position of deposits, thus constraining the ability to give liquidity. Also, higher capital requirements shall induce financial intermediaries to be more restrained in extending financing, thus constraining their ability to give liquidity. However, regarding to another view, higher capital should let the financial intermediary to make more liquidity since its risk-absorptive capacity should be improved.[10] In this regard, an empirical study concluded that for larger banks capital has a statistically significant positive net effect on liquidity creation, while for tiny banks this effect is negative.[11] Accordingly, each financial intermediary should need to evaluate carefully the position and composition regarding the capital it needs, since the latter plays a significant role in its ability to function like a liquidity provider. Equally, regulators should need to pay attention to the impact which capital requirement should have on the funding regarding the economy.
IIFS's risk management arrangements shall bear on their ability to calibrate capital to their business objectives and risk tolerance, to deal with market discipline, and to maintain a dialogue with regulators. The IIFS's characteristic of mobilizing funds within the shape of risk-sharing investment accounts in location of conventional deposits, together with the materiality[12] of financing transactions, shall alter the overall risk regarding the balance sheet and, consequently, the assessment of their capital requirements. Indeed, risk-sharing "deposits" should in principle reduce the need for a safety cushion to weather adverse investment outcomes. Similarly, the materiality of investments is likely to modify the extent of their risk and hold a bearing on the assessment for the overall need for capital; asset-based modes of finance should be fewer risky and profit-sharing modes more risky, than conventional interest-bearing modes. Nevertheless, IIFSs should operate within a regulatory framework that is likely to impose on them capital requirements with a view to promoting stability and limiting contagion risks. However, besides regulatory and market demands for IIFSs to hold capital, IIFSs need to place in location risk management assessments for their own purposes of returns and stability in accordance with the requirements of Shari'ah, their own mission statements, and the protection of their stakeholders. [1] Look Honohan (2004) and Levine (2004).
[2] Sir Paul Hicks identifies such liquidity as one regarding the first factors behind the Industrial Revolution.
[3] Actually, a deposit should be viewed like a purchase of a debt asset issued by the intermediary and redeemable at its face value.
[4] The institution–market competition is reflected within the trends of their relative market shares of total financial assets. For example, within the United States, between 1960 and the early 1990s, commercial banks' share of total financial intermediaries' assets fell from around 40% to fewer than 30%. Look Edwards (1996).
[5] They do respond to a latent demand for financial services that not ever breach Shari'ah principles. Accordingly, they have the potential to contribute to financial deepening, economic growth, and corporate inclusion. Look also Burghardt and Fuss (2004).
[6] Modigliani and Miller (1958).
[7] Look Klingebiel and Laeven (2007).
[8] Views differ on the need for and extent of regulation, as well as on the usefulness of deposit insurance; look Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2007).
[9] Diamond and Rajan (2006).
[10] Allen and Gale (2007).
[11] Berger and Bouwman (2005).
[12] By the "materiality" of financing transactions is meant that, in such transactions, capital should be "materialized" within the shape of an asset or asset services (as in Murabaha credit sales, Salam and Istisna'a financing, or Ijarah leasing), or of a business venture (Musharakah or Mudarabah). Capital within the shape of money is not entitled to any return, as this should be interest (riba).
...... to be Cont.
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